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Outline
I. Introduction
A. Gold Standard
1. Characteristics of the pre-war Gold Standard
2 .
a. Free convertibility of paper currency
into gold
b. Free coinage
c. Free export and import of gold
d. Unit of value maintained at a value
equal to a fixed quantity of gold
in a free market
Its inherent advantages and their significance
a. Theoretical
b. Actual
3. General discussion of and the reasons for
the breakdown of the Gold Standard through-
out the world, especially in Germany, Eng-
land and the United States
4. The results of the breakdown on
a . Trade
b. International exchanges
c. Monetary systems
B . Managed Currency
1. Theories
a. Fisher
b. Warren
c. Cassel
d. Keynes
e. Kemmerer

( 2 )
2. History of some of the attempts at managing
currency throughout the world
a. Examples
(1) France
(2) Germany
(3) United States
b. Analysis of the reasons for their failure
and the knowledge gained from these
experiences
II. Sweden and Managed Currency
A. Discussion of the factors peculiar to Sweden
because of which a managed currency might be
successful there and in the same form fail in
other countries
History of the Bank of Sweden
1 . Extent of authority as granted in the
original charter
2. History of the policy of the Bank in regard to
a. Discount rate
b. Loans
c. International relations
d. Gold
3. Action taken by the Bank during the War and
in subsequent years
a. Conditions in Europe which necessitated
this action
b. Conditions within the country which
influenced it
(1) Price level
(2) Withdrawals of capital from Sweden
by other countries
C. Abandonment of the Gold standard and Adoption of a
Managed Currency

( 3 )
1. Objectives of the management of the currency
a. Stabilization of the kronor in foreign
exchange
b. Maintenance of a stable level of prices
c. Economic prosperity
2. Means of managing the currency
a. Purchases of Government Bonds
b. Transactions in foreign markets
c. Changes in the official bank rate
d. Dealings in gold
D. Results of the management of the currency in Sweden
a. Relative degree of success or failure to
accomplish the purposes outlined above
b. Effect of Sweden* s management on the
rest of the world
III. Great Britain
A. History of the Gold Standard in Great Britain to
1914
1. Brief discussion of the establishment of the
Gold Standard in England and the changes
made in the Standard from that time until
the World War
B. Conditions in England during the War to the break-
down of the Gold Standard
1. War-time Inflation in England
a. Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1914
(1) Purposes- chief of which was
to provide notes - the need
for which was created by
(a) Increase in export of gold
(b) Decreased personnel in
factories
(c) Increased wages
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(2) Results
b. Cunliffe Committee
(1) Recommendations of this Committee
(2) England's failure to act on these
proposals
,
the reason for this
and the wisdom of it.
c. Gold Standard Act of 1925
(1) Steps taken to accomplish this
(2) Provisions of the Act
(3) Advisability of the Act in the
light of an analysis of subse-
quent events
d. Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928
(1) Provisions
(2) Results
C. Breakdown of the Gold Standard in 1931
1. Analysis of the conditions in England and
on the continent leading up to this
breakdown
a. Discussion of the complex interpendepen-
dence of monetary systems
b. Flagrant errors made by countries in
regard to their currencies which made
abandonment of the Gold Standard
imperative in all the important
countries in Europe with the single
exception of France
2. Effect of the action taken by England on
a. Price of gold
b. Discount rates
c. Foreign investors and depositors in
England
d. Cost of living and wages
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IV.
3. Results as regards
a. Psychology of the people in their
attitude toward their currencies
b. Other countries
D. Adoption of Managed Currency
1. Methods of controlling the currency
2. Purposes and aims of this control
3. Exchange Equalization Fund
a. Purposes
b. Results
E. Future of the Gold Standard in England
The United States
A. Brief discussion of the early monetary history
of the United States to 1879 - the period
when no attempt was made to manage currency
1. Experience with paper currencies
a. The Continentals
b. The Greenbacks
2. Relations of our trade balances to the
problem of regulating the value of the
currency
B. Establishment of the Gold Standard
1. Under the National Banking System
a. Regulation of note issues
b. Reserve policies-gold
C. Establishment of the Federal Reserve System and
the beginning of the management of currency
1. its significance in regard to the central-
ization of banking authority
2. Its powers over banking policy, the dis-
count rate
,
reserve requirements
*
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3.
Its importance in the monetary and economic
life of the country
D. Immediate and ultimate effect of the World War
on the American monetary system
1. Influx of gold
2. Influx of foreign capital due to the loss
of confidence of foreigners in their
depreciating currencies and due to the
possibility of speculation in American
marke ts
3. Favorable trade balances due to War pur-
chases
4. Price level fluctuations especially in
early 1920*
s
5. Disturbances in foreign markets due to
action taken by other countries in the
direction of abandoning the Gold Standard
6. Consequences of their disturbances on
financial conditions in the United States
E. Abandonment of the Gold Standard by the United
States and its significance
1. Use of the Trading v/ith the Enemy Act of
1917 to forbid the export of gold in 1933
2. Inflation Act of May 12, 1933
a. Powers given to the Secretary of the
Treasury under the provisions of
this Act
3.
b. Meaning of these powers from the
standpoint of the Gold Standard
Gold Purchase Act of 1934
a. Purpose
b. Provisions
c. Results
F. Discussion of the merits and weaknesses of the
actions taken as outlined above in Section E
.,
(7 )
1. Effect on the price level, on the exchange
values of the dollar, on cost of living,
v/ages and incomes, on trade, on recovery
in general.
2. Psychological effect
G. Future of managed currency in the United States
1. Conditions peculiar to the United States
a. Protectionist policy
b. Huge reserves of gold not being used
for monetary purposes
c. Reparations owed to the United States
2. Dependence of the dollar on other units of
currency and the possibility of the
United States taking action as an
isolated nation
V. Conclusion
A. A return to gold unlikely because
1. Maldistribution of gold makes pre-war gold
standard impossible
2. Countries are developing managed currency
systems which will be as satisfactory
as gold
3. Countries are not likely to return to a
gold standard in which their currencies
are lower than the old gold parities -
with the intention of making the standard
a permanent proposition.
B. if the pre-war gold standards were to be
re-established, it would be so managed as to
be very unlike the pre-war standard. The
trend has been toward greater and greater
management
*


INTRODUCTION
"The system of currency, known as the gold
standard, is an outstanding example of deliberate and
effective currency management. It had its origin in
an ambitious experiment in currency manipulation more
than a century before its formal adoption in 1816. nl
If, then, the gold standard and managed currency are
not separate and distinct systems but coincide as Sir
Morgan-Webb maintains
,
any discussion of the latter
should be introduced by an examination into the char-
acter and working of the former.
Of all the countries in the world England has
played the most significant part in monetary history.
In the seventeenth century under Elizabeth, England
grew to be the most important trading country in the
world, a position which has she has not been forced to
yield to anyone. In addition she was the world's
most successful colonizer. Because of her supremacy
in commerce, she became a financial center; because
of her wide empire
,
she was able to come into posses-
sion of vast stocks of silver and gold. Finding it
1 The Money Revolution, Sir Charles Morgan-Webb,
New York 1935, p. 44.
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necessary on account of the first result and possible
by the second, she was the first country to experiment
with monetary standards . Although she was not the
first to try a gold standard, she v/as the first to
adopt a pure monetary standard. About 1700 England
went onto the sterling standard, using gold only as
a subsidiary medium of exchange in the form of small
coins. This sterling standard was very satisfactory
and was only abandoned at the end of the century when
silver tended to go out of the country at such a rate
to India and the East that she had an insufficient
supply of silver to satisfy her needs of it for inter-
nal trade. After attempts especially on the part of
Sir Isaac Newton at keeping the silver standard intact
proved to be futile she adopted the gold standard in
1816 maintaining it until she was forced to abandon
it at the end of the World War. England* s experience
with the gold standard was of the greatest significance
in subsequent monetary history. Since Great Britain
was the controlling power in world trade
,
other countries
found it to their advantage to adopt a monetary standard
similar to hers or if this was not possible to tie their
currencies to the pound by keeping the value of the two
fairly constant. In addition the gold standard as developed
*-
- -»
in England in the Nineteenth Century came to he the
gold standard in the opinion of the rest of the world.
Characteristics of the Gold Standard
However there are many differences in opinion as
to what constitutes a gold standard. Sir Charles
Morgan-Webb maintains that there is no such thing as
the gold standard; he claims ,rthe term 'the gold
standard' embodies a fallacy, one of the most expen-
sive fallacies which has deluded the world. It is
the fallacy that there is one particular* gold standard,
and one only. There are innumerable gold standards."-*-
He claims he is justified in this view by reasoning
that since units of account as the pound, franc and
dollar may represent widely divergent ’weights of gold,
and since the weights of each may be changed by the will
of legislative bodies each unit represents a different
gold standard from the other and each change in the gold
content of one unit introduces a new gold standard.
Professor Kemmerer says, "The gold standard is a
monetary system in which prices and wages are customar-
ily expressed and in which debts are usually contracted,
1 The Rise and Fall of the Gold Standard,
Sir Charles Morgan-Webb, New York 1934,
p. 11.
<—
. .
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consists of the value of a fixed quantity of gold in a
free gold market.** 1 Most authorities agree with
Kemmerer that the test as to whether a unit is or is not
on the gold standard is determined solely by its fixed
relationship to gold. Because experience has shown that
when the gold standard is in operation certain conditions
exist, these conditions have come to be thought of as
inherent in the gold standard and although this is not
the case, nevertheless countries find it almost impossible
to have free unhampered working of the gold standard with-
out the presence of these conditions. Mr. Gustav Cassel
holds the view that when countries were obliged to alter
these conditions, as during the World War, it meant they
could no longer maintain the gold standard although no
formal declaration was made in regard to the value of
the unit of account. Convertibility of paper into gold
was characteristic of the pre-war gold standard. When
notes were first issued a 100% backing of the note was
held; gradually as more paper money was required, notes
were issued with less than 100% backing until it was a
general condition that there was less than half as
much gold as paper. There was no danger in this
1 Kemmerer on Money, Edwin W. Kemmerer,
Philadelphia, 1934, p. 2.
*
situation, however, as the public had confidence in
monetary conditions and did not demand gold. Another
characteristic of the pre-war gold standard was the
free export and import of gold between countries in
payment for goods bought and sold in foreign tra.de.
Shipping gold was rather inconvenient at times and bills
of exchange came into wide usage; after this, gold was
applied only to settlement of balances. But as long
as an acceptable international medium wa.s available
trade flourished; when gold could no longer be exported
and imported and when as usually occurred, tariff walls
were ra.ised, trade fell off. The difficulty of payment
was at least partially responsible for this. A less
important but equally common condition of the gold stan-
dard was the free coinage of bullion. Under ordinary
circumstances free coinage has been abolished simultan-
eously with prohibitions in regard to the convertibility
of paper into metal.
Advantages of the Gold Standard
In theory, if the gold standard is the monetary
system in all countries in the world, it keeps prices
fairly uniform, encourages trading between nations,
eliminates fluctuations in the exchanges and makes
.
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all monetary units stable in value internally as well
as externally. Its effect is automatic and works as
follows: If a country has an adverse trade balance,
gold will flow out; the quantity of money in circula-
tion will decrease; prices will fall; foreign buyers
will be attracted and exports of commodities and imports
of gold will increase. Or if purchases are paid for
by foreign bills, the same automatic working of the gold
standard will take place since the price of foreign bills
will become so high in conditions of an excess of imports
over exports that buyers will find it cheaper to buy gold
and ship it than to buy exchange. It can easily be seen,
then, that goods will flow from the country where they are
cheap to the country where they are dear; and this con-
dition will continue until prices in the dear country are
reduced. J-t is also obvious that prices in the cheap
country will tend to approach as nearly as possible to
those of the dear country but not beyond the point at
which the advantage will be lost. Hence prices will
tend to be the same for a given commodity all over
the world and v/ill be close to the cost in the least
expensive markets. Since gold can be shipped to pay
for purchases abroad, foreign exchange will be bought
only so long as it is cheaper to finance foreign
.
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trade by this means than by gold. The gold points
were established automatically as a limit to the fluctua-
tions of foreign exchange. These limits equal the
value of the gold plus the costs incidental to shipping
it. Actually, of course, even under the most favorable
conditions the automatic corrective powers of the gold
standard are tendencies only. Nevertheless during the
pre-war days when the gold standard was less interrupted
in its operations than after 1914 these powers it possessed
were tendencies of considerable advantage to all the coun-
tries of the world.
From the end of the Nineteenth Century to the present
day tariff barriers have been increasing in magnitude and
range; if the world were on the gold standard today, the
gold standard would be so hampered in its working that
the world would lose many of the advantages coming from
the power of the gold standard to keep prices constant and
uniform throughout the world. In addition the balances
of payments of so many countries consist largely of in-
visible items. Therefore the price level of commodities
would not necessarily respond to the movements of gold.
Then, of course, to an ever increasing extent, central
banks have manipulated bank rate and open-market opera-
.
8 .
tions until it seems doubtful that gold movements would
be exactly those which would occur if these activities
on the part of the central bank were not indulged in, and
finally we no longer have the "independent variety of
influences determining the value of gold."-^- For all of
these reasons then the theoretical working of the gold
standard would be far from that in a.ctual practice today.
Even in pre-war days the most that could be said was that
the gold standard tended to correct disequilibria of the
various factors constituting foreign trade and resulting
from it.
Breakdown of the Gold Standard
In the past twenty years there has been considerable
criticism of the gold standard and many people have claimed
that it was a monetary system which could not be adapted
to complex modern world finance . What is nearer the truth
is to say that a country cannot support a war and enjoy the
benefits of the gold standard at the same time . This was
clearly d emonstrated during the World War in certain central
European countries, notably Germany, Austria and Russia.
The purchases by these countries far exceeded in value
Monetary Reform, John Maynard Keynes,
New York, 1924, pj.80 .

their monetary gold stocks; to pay for services and
goods internally they issued paper money in unlimited
amounts; to pay for commodities bought from neutral
countries they exported gold and used up their credits
abroad. 1918 found the belligerents and Russia with
collapsed monetary systems and the former faced with
greater reparations than it would ever be possible to
meet. As a result of the war and in the years follow-
ing it every country in Europe, except France, was
struggling to recover a stable price level, to come into
possession of sufficient gold to return to the gold stan-
dard and to balance its budget. Recognizing the fact
that the financial collapse of an important country such
as Germany meant the loss of a vast potential market,
countries with capital to invest loaned to her freely.
The citizens of the United States were guilty of specu-
lating hes.vily in German securities. There was con-
siderable flow of capital between countries. Mean-
time, and this was true up until 1929, gold had been
drawn to France and the United States in such quanti-
ties that the rest of the world lost 16% of their
gold stock. A 3% increase in the total supply of gold
resulting from newly-mined metal did not nearly compen-

sate them for that loss so that it is obvious that
central banks throughout the world were finding it
increasingly difficult to maintain their minimum re-
serves and had to resort to a deflationary policy as
a result. A deflationary policy always means an in-
creased pressure on commodity prices in a downward
direction and resulting disequilibria of world trade
and an unhealthy competition in world markets. Gustav
Cassel in "The Crisis in the World's Monetary System”
said that the causes for the great flow of gold to
the United States and France were the reparations pay-
ments which could be made only in gold, the protection-
ist prices which both countries had adopted, France's
unwillingness to make foreign loans and her desire to
increase her gold reserves as much as possible. Thus
there grew up an unprecedented accumulation of gold in
two countries leaving a shortage in the rest of the
world. And, to make matters worse, France and the
United States refused to use their gold for monetary
purposes, but instead hoarded it so that it would not
affect the price level adversely. The immediate
cause of the breakdown of the gold standard was an
unwarranted loss of confidence in banks on the part

of individuals
,
and an inexcusably selfish and short-
sighted eagerness on the part of central banks to re-
cover their funds invested abroad regardless of what
might happen to those who had to produce the funds
which they had a right to demand. For example:
England had borrowed from France on long-term and had
loaned to Germany on short-term. When the Kredit
Austaldt failed in Austria and it was agreed that
Germany was in a very precarious position, France
decided to call in her loans from England while England
was in a position to pay her back the funds. Of
course England's funds in Germany were frozen and al-
though she had adequate capital to pay all her debts
,
given enough time, the drain on her resources was so
heavy that eventually she was forced to abandon the
gold standard for the second time in seven years.
Whether she was justified in returning to the gold
standard in 1925 is debatable and most authorities
agree that she was not; but the collapse of the gold
standard in England in 1932 was neither the result of
a previous mistake nor the fault of the gold standard
itself. At least one contributing factor to the
general breakdown was the nationalistic attitude taken
-
by all countries in self protection; to maintain an
international monetary standard of any kind or even
to enjoy economic prosperity a country has to be more
or less international!stic in its viewpoint.
When countries are forced to abandon the gold
standard, assuming that no other metallic standard
is adopted which was the case in Europe in 1931-3,
they automatically adopt some form of "managed w
currency standard. John Maynard Keynes contends
that:
.... in the modern world of paper
currency and bank credit there
is no escape from a "managed"
currency whether we wish it or
not; convertibility into gold
will not alter the fact that the
value of gold itself depends
upon the policy of the central
banks." 1
He also says that:
"A regulated non-metallic standard
has slipped in unnoticed. "2
According to him there is no fundamental
difference today between a gold standard and a
Monetary Reform, John Maynard Keynes,
New York, 1924, p. 184.
Ibid, p. 187.
2
....
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managed currency system; the change is one of degree,
not of kind. Even such a hard money economist as
E. W. Kemmerer holds much the same view for he claims
that both the gold standard and a paper standard are
really managed currencies as is obvious from the fact
that the discount rate and the open market operations
are as carefully watched under one system as under
the other. H. F. Fraser in Great Britain and the Gold
Standard is of the same opinion as these other authori-
ties, for he says that it must be recognized that the
gold standard has never worked automatically; that
central banks have always been obliged to raise the
bank rate in order to contract the volume of credit
and therefore to keep the value of the currency unit
equal to that of a fixed weight of gold; and that to
that extent currencies have been managed. Gustav Cassel
says that:
"In reality the gold currency
has now become a paper currency man-
aged by the central bank." 1
The Crisis in the World's Monetary System,
Guxtav Cassel, Oxford 1932, p. 4.
1

14 .
Results of the Breakdown of the Gold Standard
While it may he agreed that the gold standard in
operation before the general breakdown in the early 1930’s
was managed in the same way and by the same means as any
managed currency which has followed the abandonment of the
gold standard, it must also be recognized that certain new
problems must be solved if this new system is not to lead
to financial chaos. That, under our new system, the char-
acter of management becomes more important cannot be de-
nied; inefficient or corrupt management can easily bring
ruin to the whole economic structure and dishonorable
manipulation of the means of managing the value of the
currency for political ends can bring injury to many
people. Frank Vanderlip advocates the establishment of
a ’Federal Monetary Authority’ to act as intermediary
and court of last appeal for banking authorities of the
Federal Reserve System and the government. He recommends
that this be composed of men of wide experience in the field
of finance and men without political prejudices. Under a
true managed paper standard, all goods in foreign trade
are paid for by debits to balances held in other countries;
gold is no longer shipped to pay for debit balances. Under
the present system, however, gold is used for this purpose.
.
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But gold has no relation to the parity of the foreign
exchange between two countries, and the value of the
unit of one country in terms of the unit of the other
is determined by the relative purchasing powers of the
units in the two countries. If a country devalues
its currency as most of the important countries have
done in the last few years, in theory, at least, there
is no limit to the drop its unit may take in the for-
eign exchange markets, or conversely no limit to the
rise of the currencies of the other countries, who have
not similarly debased their money, may reach in terms
of it. No longer does gold export and import act as
a check on fluctuations of the exchanges. The disad-
vantages of a fluctuating exchange are well known.
Unless currencies can be so judiciously managed that
stability of prices and exchanges can be approached,
and we are not sure they can be
,
there will always be
the danger of sudden rises or drops in the price level
due to a change of policy on the part of those in charge
of controlling the amounts of credit and money in cir-
culation. The problem is at least in part psychological,
because within the memory of all people living today who
can think about these matters at all, the gold standard

is as much a part of orderly and prosperous conditions
as the Constitution is to the people of the United
States. Also because people saw how disastrous can be
a managed currency if out of hand as in the case of Ger-
many during the War, they are skeptical of any currency
which is not tied to something as secure as they feel
gold to be. Gustav Cassel in Monetary and Foreign
Exchange After 1914 maintains that reserves of gold
were and still are idolized by the general public who
feel that gold behind paper gives a mysterious value to
that paper regardless of its quantity. Whether or not
people are justified in distrusting managed paper it is
an understandable reaction and must be considered in mak'
ing any appraisal of the existing system or of proposed
systems. Confidence in paper is largely what gives it
its value; the success of managed currency will then be
determined by the amount of confidence it deserves.
Theories of Managed Currency
There are many economists who do not feel that
the old gold standard was entirely satisfactory nor do
they feel that the ordinary managed paper standard would
*
be entirely adequate to bring about stability of prices,
purchasing power of units of account, and of the exchanges
Many schemes have been suggested whereby the world may
experience the joys of a ’perfect* monetary system. Prob-
ably the most debated proposal is that by Professor Fisher
His plan is to have a "compensated" dollar or as it is
called, a "commodity" dollar. m this scheme he would
have drawn up a comprehensive and thoroughly representa-
tive index number which would reflect changes in the price
level. He would have the dollar equated to the value of
a certain weight of gold, but this weight would be subject
to change from time to time. On the basis of changes in
the price level as indicated by fluctuations in the index
number he would alter the gold content of the dollar.
This change would be calculated to correct the rise or
fall in the price level so that stability of prices would
be obtained. This proposal has occasioned considerable
comment by other economists. Mr. Keynes refers to
Professor Fisher’s theory as follows:
"He (Professor Fisher) may have been
influenced, however, by the advantage of
propounding a method which could be grafted
as easily as possible on to the pre-war
system of gold reserves and gold ratios.
In any case I doubt the wisdom and the
.
practicability of a system so cut and
dried. If we wait until a price
movement is actually afoot before
applying remedial measures , we may be
too late. Professor Fisher* s method
may be adapted to deal with long-
period trends in the value of gold
but not with the often more injur-
ious, short period oscillations
of the credit cycle. 11 1
E. W. Kernmerer criticizes Fisher *s plan on the
basis of the followings
"All in all, under present-day
economic and political conditions in
America, a price level anchored to a
commodity of universal demand, such
as gold --a commodity of which there
is always an enormous marketable
supply, and of which the annual pro-
duction is but a petty percentage of
the world's stock — is likely to be
much more stable and dependable than
a price level controlled by any such
mechanism as that of the commodity
dollar. Such a dollar may work in
a model state of a distant utopian
future. It would have hard sledding
in the United States of 1934. "2
1 Monetary Reform, «John M. Keynes,
New York, 1924, p. 203.
2 T/-Kemmerer on Money. E. W. Kernmerer
Philadelphia, 1934, p. 213

19 .
Even more dubious than Professor Kemmerer about
the advisability of attempting a managed currency scheme
is C. R. Noyes about the soundness of the proposal from
the standpoint of economics. He argues that increases
in the money in circulation do not under ordinary cir-
cumstances affect supply and demand and hence have no
immediate or even necessarily long time effect on price
levels
5
he makes this statement on the theory that the
price level keeps money in circulation rather than that
any new additions to money cause and maintain a higher
price level. He says further that the value of gold
is fixed in terms of the dollar and that this has come
about by the introduction of credit money as a medium
of exchange. To quote from his article, The Stabilizing
of the Dollar:
•'The dollar is a legal fiction.
It is a unit in which prices are
stated but it does not itself con-
trol prices. M I
James Warburg claims that a dollar of constant
purchasing power is impossible to attain, that no system
of monetary reform will work satisfactorily unless it
The Stabilizing of the Dollar, C. R. Noyes.
Article in Journal, of Political Economy,
March, 1921, p. 204.
.
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is adopted by all countries. Furthermore, he says:
•*To raise the price level alone is,
to my mind, not a proper aim of a re-
covery program; unless a rise in prices
is accompanied by a rise in incomes, 1
can not see that it does anyone any good.” 1
Thus Professor Fisher’s theory is attacked as to its
aim and as to the method of accomplishing that aim.
But the significance of Fisher's plan is not
that it has ever been adopted or ever will be adopted
in full, but the fact that it enjoys the support of
a person such as Professor Warren of Cornell, who has
been President Roosevelt's financial adviser.
Fisher and Warren agreed that there should be devalua-
tion of the dollar in 1933 and were influential in se-
curing the passage of the Thomas Amendment to the Farm
Relief Act which provided for devaluation of the dollar
up to 60%. At that time Fisher said:
‘•Professor Warren, adviser to the
President, said in his book on Prices
that we cannot permanently leave the
1926 price level with the gold that we
Reply to Senator Elmer Thomas and Professor I.
Fisher, James P. Warburg. Article in Annals
of the American Academy, June, 1934, p. 148.
..
then had unless we devalue the gold
dollar so as to increase the number
of gold dollars at the basis of our
credit structure.” 1
Professor Fisher favored price rise; in 1934 he said:
"
. . .
.
deflation is as bad as inflation
and . . .
.
debt deflation has caused
75% of this depression by shrinking
bank deposits to such an extent that
prices were forced down.” 2
Professor Warren’s theory was that the price of
gold was the essential factor to be considered and he
did not feel that the stabilization of the dollar in
foreign markets should be attempted until the dollar
had been devalued sufficiently to bring about a sub-
stantial price rise in this country. Obviously he
was convinced that prices respond automatically to
changes in the price of gold. James Warburg also
favored devaluation but felt that it should be limited
to 65 to 75 percent, of the original parity.
Gustav Cassel holds the view that an internation-
al gold standard would be as hard to maintain as a
national gold standard; that gold is a most unsuitable
Reflation and Stabilization, Irving Fisher.
Article in Annual American Academy, 1934, p. 127.
2 Ibid, p. 130
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standard of value and that to return to gold is to
subject a currency to unnecessary fluctuations. 1
He also claims that the responsibility for the stabil-
ity of the price level rests with the central bank and
can be affected only by an increase or decrease in the
number of units of currency in circulation. Monetary
stability then, according to Cassel, can be achieved
only by a deliberate monetary policy which constantly
changes the supply of monetary units; this he says
must be in the hands of the central banks. In carrying
out such a scheme as this some sort of index number
would have to be invented to reflect accurately fluctua-
tions in the price level. The success of any scheme
which depends solely upon the use of a price index immed-
iately seems doubtful because the construction of an
adequate and comprehensive index number is a most diffi-
cult task; the problem of when adjustment should be made
is one which few are equipped to solve, and the final
decision as to exactly how much currency should be added
or substracted from the amount in circulation given a
change in prices would be a tremendously great responsi-
bility. It should be noted that a distinction must be
1
The Crisis in the World* s Monetary System,
Gustav Cassel, Oxford, 1932.
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drawn between money in circulation and credit money
which, at least in the case of the United States and
England, is by far more important than coin in figur-
ing total medium of exchange. Probably the most
obvious criticism to be made of Cassel's theory is
that changes in the amount of money in circulation
are not immediate in their effect on prices. Since
under ordinary circumstances, prices fluctuate be-
cause of economic factors
,
increases and decreases
in the discount rate or in the volume of bills and
coin in circulation cannot hope to bring about
fundamental changes in the relative amount of supply
and demand. Unless these factors of demand and supply
are such as to absorb more money or to allow it to be
withdrawn, no policy on the part of central banking
authorities to raise or lower prices will have any
substantial meaning-.
Dr. A. C. Miller issued the following statement
pertinent to this. He said:
"Assuming that we want price
stability, in order to obtain it
we have to look at things closer
to the source or beginning of
troubles than the price index.
If you are to have competent con-
%
trol of credit you cannot wait until
inflationary developments register them-
selves in the price index. By that time
the thing will have already gotten con-
siderable momentum. Restraint on in-
flation really requires a degree of fore-
sight and requires other methods of test-
ing what is in course of development than
the price index. The price index looks
backward . " 1
Keynes likewise objects to the gold standard.
He says*
"The instability of money has been
compounded in most countries except the
United States, of two elements: the
failure of the national currencies to
remain stable in terms of what was
supposed to be the standard of value
,
namely, gold; and the failure of gold
itself to remain stable in terms of
purchasing power.
He would have an inconvertible paper currency; the
aim of the management of this currency would be to
keep internal price level stable. Secondary in im-
portance would be the exchange rates which he would
keep from fluctuating by the means of the gold which
had formerly been used to support the currency issues.
In order to bring about a stable price level Keynes,
Hearings on the Strong Bill, H.R. Committee
on Banking and Currency, 1926-1927.
Q
Monetary Reform, John M. Keynes,
Hew York, 1924, p. 152.

along with Cassel, would use a composite commodity
index number though he recognizes that other factors
as state of employment, and volume of production
would have to be taken into account in deciding what
changes to make. Under his plan the central banks
would, as they do at present, continue to engage in
open market operations and to manipulate the discount
rate as they see fit. Of course, it must be admitted
that these operations on the part of the central author-
ities become less important when the tie up with gold
is severed. However much it is said that gold is so
unstable in value as to be of little consequence as a
stabilizer for units of account, it has to be recognized
that it is so much more stable than any other commodity
or group of commodities e.s to be preferable to them.
On the other hand if a government regulates the price
of gold to any extent or by any means, the advantages
of having the value of gold free to reflect forces of
supply and demand would be lost. All countries which
professed to be on a gold standard have done this price
fixing to some extent. Nevertheless, when a country
is true to a gold standard and limits the amount of
currency by the amount of gold it holds and regulates

the value of the unit by that gold at whatever ratio
,
it enjoys some protection from poor management and
from excess paper issue. On whatever count Keynes'
managed currency plan may be criticised, it must be
noted that England's and Sweden's systems since 1932,
in the case of the former and since 1931 in the case
of the latter, while not fully carried to the point
to which Keynes would recommend, are so nearly con-
structed on the lines he proposes that we must regard
his plan seriously and with respect.
Some Attempts at Ivianaging Currency
Before considering in detail Swedish monetary
history and her monetary system of the present day a
brief examination of the experiences of the world with
managed currency may serve to indicate with what care
countries must proceed if they are to prosper under
this new system. It must be conceded at the outset
that managed currency in the past has been adopted as
a result of emergency as in the case of Germany and
the United States
,
or internal revolution as in the
case of France. Therefore, whether it is fair to
conclude that under normal conditions this system of
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paper money would not work well because in unusual
circumstances it was so unsatisfactory, is a question
which might be raised. Though it would be foolish
to answer this question in the affirmative, the lesson
to be learned from the experience of others justifies
the investigation. Managed currency really means fiat
money though the term “fiat” connotes something' very
undesirable in the way of money; “fiat” money immediately
suggests a currency which should be viewed with suspicion
and probably accepted only at a discount. This feeling
is understandable..
The United States during; the American Revolution
In 1775 the Congress of the United States authorized
the issuance of the Continental Bills of Credit for the
purpose of financing the Revolutionary War. The only
security which these bills had was the uncertain credit
of the Colonies. As a result the bills deprecia.ted
until they were entirely worthless. This did not result
from overissuance but happened simply because the people
grew suspicious of their value when they were considered
to be of such little account in foreign trade. Why
should England, for example, receive them at par when her

own pound notes v/ere redeemable in gold?
France during the Revolution of 1789
During the last part of the French Revolution
the National Assembly caused to be issued first 400
million francs, then 800 million francs, and still
more until a total of 65 billion francs had been
issued. They v/ere secured by national property at
first; later, of course, it became apparent that
whereas the 400 million had been more or less satis-
factorily secured, the 65 billion v/ere not backed by
anything. The total issuance of Assignaus became
worthless. The Mandats which v/ere issued to take
the place of the Assignats and which v/ere secured by
real estate, depreciated also until they were not
worth anything.
Germany during the World War
But more pertinent in a discussion on managed
currency is Germany's experience during the World War.
If one reason were to be given for Germany's tremendous
inflation during the War it would be that marks v/ere
issued without any regard for the needs of business.
.
without any hacking except government obligations
which may be unlimited in amount, and without any
respect for internal price level or exchange value.
The reason for the worthlessness of the French
Assignat and the German Mark was overissuance .
That is the most obvious but also the most important
danger to be avoided in any managed currency system.
Just as soon as an inconvertible paper gets out of
hand because the government finds itself pressed for
funds, chaos is imminent; it is almost impossible to
check inflation once it gets started. Fortunately
this is a fairly universally acknowledged fact and
governments have proceeded cautiously to an admirable
degree since the War in establishing their managed
currency systems to take the place of the gold standard
which they found themselves unable to support. Per-
haps no country has managed its currency more ably
than Sweden.
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SWEDEN
Discussion of the Factors in Sweden Peculiarly
Favorable to Managed Currency Experiment
Sweden had two initial advantages in attempting
an experiment such as managed paper currency was when
she first went onto it. Her population consists
collectively of a homogeneous group, individually of
calm, solid, stolid, fairly intelligent people; they
are interested in civic affairs and ready at all times
to cooperate with the government in matters of economic
and political benefit. Sweden has a socialistic form
of government at present under the leadership of the
Social Democratic Party. The result of this Socialistic
form of government is that there is the closest coopera-
tion between business and the state and the banking
authorities. Therefore any sensible scheme which the
authorities want to try would be enthusiastically re-
ceived and supported. Less in Sweden than in most
countries is political favoritism cherished and acquired
by popular though sometimes unsound action. In the
United States for example one group of interests will
'.
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wish the discount rate raised, another group will strongly
favor the rate as it stands; the rate is manipulated or
let alone according to whichever group of interests is
stronger.
History of the Bank of Sweden
But Sweden has always been progressive in monetary
affairs. Her central bank was the first to issue bank
paper notes; her entire banking system which was char-
tered in 1656 was established as a central bank. The
charter granted provided for the establishment of one
bank which was permitted to set up branches of itself
in other parts of the country. in 1900 there were
66 commercial banks with 269 branch offices and total
resources of 1370 million kronor. In 1910 there were
80 banks, the maximum number in Swedish history; in
1920 there were 41 banks with 1410 branches, and in
1936, 28 with 1032 branches. in the latter year the
largest three of the banks represented 55% of all re-
sources - which meant control of about 5400 million
out of 9820 million krona. The Swedish banking system
early adapted itself to finance the capital requirements
of industry and thus arose the need for a high degree of
'
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decentralization. The tendency in recent years has
been, obviously, to decrease the number of banking in-
stitutions since it was felt that a fewer stronger banks
secured a more satisfactorily controllable set-up than
one which was composed of many small banks.
Nature of the Bank of Sweden
The Swedish people keep their savings in the form
of time deposits rather than as checking accounts; as
both cause and result of this fact checks are much less
widely used than in other countries as England and the
United States. Therefore the Bank of Sweden note plays
a very important role. Hence the "changes in the note
circulation are of primary interest, .... and the best
indicator of the Bank of Sweden is the note reserve i. e.
the difference between the maximum limit of the note issue
and the amount in circulation." 1 By virtue of the fact
that the Swedish banks carry mostly time deposits, under-
write few new bond issues, and carry almost no stocks in
their portfolios, they very seldom have to close their
doors because of "runs" on the part of the public demand-
ing cash, because of frozen assets, or because of losses
from unsound investments. Another peculiar characteristic
1 Managed Money, Erik T. H. Kjellstrom,
New York, 1934, p. 11.
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of the Swedish banks is that they are all members of the
Stockholm Stock Exchange. As a result of this fact they
act as brokers do in other countries in selling and pur-
chasing stocks; their close touch with the stock market
on this account puts them in a position to sense any un-
healthy condition in the stock market and their position
as bankers gives them the power to initiate action to
rectify the factors causing it. Further the Bank of
Sweden is unique among the banks of the world in the fact
that it is a state institution under the direct supervision
of the Parliament. The Board of Governors of the Bank,
however, keep a careful watch to see that its activities
are not unduly dictated by the Parliament although it is
answerable to the Parliament for action taken. it may
be presumed that Parliament allows those in authority
over banking procedure considerable freedom under ordinary
circumstances. The closeness of the link between bank
and government must work to the advantage of both bodies.
In 1897 the Bank became the sole note issuing insti-
tution in the country. j.t was permitted to issue up to
double its gold reserve and if necessary in time of war
or any monetary emergency whatsoever, to issue above this
amount 125 million kronor. The amount of bank notes
not covered by gold had to be backed by “gilt-edged
.-
.
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domestic bonds, foreign government bonds, gold deposited
abroad or in transit, domestic or foreign bills of exchange,
credit balances with some bank or accepting house abroad
maturing within six months
,
and loans against gilt-edged
domestic bonds or/and foreign government bonds. 1 ’ 1 Paper
backed by a combination of gold and any or all of the above
named securities was very secure indeed. The Bank of Sweden
is a banker’s bank in the sense that aside from non-interest
bearing deposits which it carries for the government its
deposits consist chiefly of the deposits of banks. As
is consistent with this fact the bank does not loan direct-
ly to the public although it may if it chooses; the small-
er banks and the commercial banks carry on this particular
activity. In this regard the Bank of Sweden resembles the
Federal Reserve Banks in the United States. But it is un-
like the Federal Reserve Banks in that it seldom engages in
open market operations. Since the commercial banks are
always indebted to the central bank and are closely connected
with it though not actually branches of it, the rediscount
rate is a very formidable weapon in the hands of the bank
in guiding the policies of the banking system.
Managed Currency, Erik T.H. Kjellstrom,
New York, 1934, p. 14.
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Action Taken by the Bank during the World War
The operation of this system was very satisfactory
until the advent of the World War when circumstances arose
which the bank had difficulty in controlling. On August
3 , 1914 the redemption in gold of bank notes was suspended
although until the end of the next year the kronor along
with the monetary units of Norway and Sweden was "pegged”
on the exchanges. Convertibility of notes was not resumed
until January of 1916. Meantime Sweden had been having
trouble regulating her gold supply. Being a neutral
country and a producer of raw materials, Sweden exported a
tremendous amount of goods. Her purchasers paid her in
gold. In common with several other countries she found too
great an import of gold dangerous to the price level and to
the unit of account. To protect herself, therefore, Sweden
on February 8, 1916 adopted a gold exclusion policy and
passed a law to that effect—whereby she refused to buy
any gold presented to her for purchase. On April 28 of
the same year free mintage was suspended according to an
agreement she had made with Norway and Denmark. it was
notable, however, that the agreement between these coun-
tries by which free coinage was to be forbidden in the
three did not prohibit gold from going into Denmark and
Norway. But Norwegian and Danish coins were legal tender
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in Sweden according to an article passed by the last
Scandinavian convention which renewed an agreement made
in 1873. Therefore gold made its way into Sweden in
spite of the embargo which she had placed upon it. To
be noted also is the fact that although Sweden was not
officially buying gold, the Riksbank, on its own initia-
tive, made purchases of gold during 1917 so that by the
end of the year it had increased its reserves by 30
million kronor.
Sweden’s policy of refusing access to gold proved
to be very foolish; she would have done better to let
gold come and go under normal conditions letting the
kronor fluctuate with the value of gold. if purchases
of gold had been made by the bank in the quantities which
would have been made had no restrictions been placed on
such action, the bank’s domestic loans as well as its
other interest bearing assets would have been reduced to
a minimum and it is possible that the notes outstanding
might have been 100% backed by gold. Although Sweden's
gold stocks were 102,000,000 krona in 1913 and 285,566,000
in 1919, the notes in circulation had increased from
254,000,000 krona to 813,534,000 in 1918 so that the in-
creases in gold could not cover the increases in note
1 Money and Foreign Exchange After 1914,
Cassel, p. 93.
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issues. Therefore when the people began to ask for re-
demption of notes in gold, the Riksbank was unable to
meet their demands. On March 20, 1920 the bank openly
admitted that it was not in a position to give out gold
and "from that time onward the Swedish currency showed
itself openly as a depreciated paper currency. x How
much better off Sweden would have been had she never
severed the connection between her currency and gold as
she did in 1917, is shown in the experience of Norway
and Denmark who let their currencies remain on gold and
fluctuate proportionally with the value of gold. The
fall in the value of gold could not be considered serious.
The exchange rate of the krona remained fairly stable for
the first two years of the War and in 1917 rose 47 cents.
As is shown in the following table, its value fell off,
however, in 1920 due to the action by the bank which
prohibited redemption of notes in gold.
Yearly Average Exchange Rates of the Swedish Krona
Yean Av.Rate Year Av.Rate Year Av. Rate
1914 $ .2655 1919 $.2554 1924 $.2652
1915 .2589 1920 .2049 1925 .2615
1916 .2876 1921 .2254 1926 .2676
1917 .3263 1922 .2617 1927 .2681
1918 .3280 1923 .2655 1928
1929
.2680
.2678
1 Money and Foreign Exchange After 1914,
Cassel, p. 95.

Swedish exchange on the New York market v/as
unlike those of England and France which were selling
at a premium in 1914; this was true
,
principally be-
cause krona were accepted at a discount in London and
Paris. At the same time pounds, francs, dollars and
florins rose on the Swedish market during 1914 and
1915 but began to fall before the end of the latter
year so that by January 1916 they were all below par.
This rise of Sweden* s exchange and fall of the exchanges
of England, France, the United States and the Netherlands
continued until 1917 after which time the trend was in
the opposite direction.
Monetary History after the War
After August 1918 the exchange value of the krona
fell in New York reaching pan in 1919 and slumping badly
after that. This was partially due to the fact that New
York withdrew her support from the currencies of the Allies
and partially due to the fact that the price level in
Sweden v/as higher than in the United States. About 1919
the amount of the note circulation began to decline as
the tremendous credit structure which had come into exis-
tance to finance and maintain war activity contracted to
,.
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meet the needs of peace time conditions. The policy
of the Swedish bank had been to keep the discount rate
low in order to make readily available the capital need-
ed by industry. Credit expension was, therefore, unduly
great. It was not until after five years of credit ex-
pansion that in 1924 the banking authorities felt that
they could resume convertibility of notes. On March 29
of that year Parliament voted to resume specie payments
and to lift the embargo on gold. But they did not put
the banks under any legal obligation to buy gold pre-
sented to them for purchase. Nor did they reopen the
mints to free coinage. This went into effect April 1
and at that time Sweden technically went back onto the
gold standard. By 1929 the bank had reduced the notes
outstanding and coin in circulation to 569,000,000;
succeeded in maintaining a gold reserve of just a little
less than its high in 1919 — that is 285,566,000 krona
as opposed to 245,000,000 krona, in 1929 and had built up
balances abroad equal to 266,000,000. Sweden’s trade
was brisker in 1929 than it had ever been. The follow-
ing table shows Sweden’s trade balance for the years
1927-1932
.
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Sweden’s Foreign Trade 1927-1932^
tln million kronor)
Year imports Exports Trade Surplus
Import
-
Exports
Trade
Total
1927 1,584.4 1 ,616.6 +32.2 3,201.0
1928 1,708.0 1,574.7 -133.3 3,282.7
1929 1,782.6 1,812.3 4-29.7 3,594.9
1930 1,662.2 1,550.4 -111.8 3,212.6
1931 1,427.5 1,122.4 -305.1 2,549.9
1932 1,147.2 944.8 -203.1 2,092.7
Mr. Kjellstrom makes the following interesting
comment on Sweden’s foreign trade balance:
"Although Sweden’s consumption of
the main staple commodities sold in the
world market cannot compare with her ex-
ports of raw products and semi-manufac-
tured goods, it was, nevertheless, the
relatively high value of her imports
which was largely responsible for
Sweden’s abandonment of the gold standard. "2
As can readily be seen, Sweden’s foreign trade
during this period showed a very noticeable decline in
exports after 1929 and a comparatively slight decline
in imports. For this Kjellstrom gives the following
reasons:
1 Source: The Skandinavska Kreditaktiebolaget
Quarterly Report, April, 1933.
Managed Money, Erik T. H. Kjellstrom,
New York, 1934, p. 18.
2

“(1) that the purchasing power of the
Swedish public did not tend to
decline
;
(2) the Swedish price level remained
higher than the price level through-
out the world;
(3) There was considerable import of
long-term foreign capital and
short-term funds into Sweden;
(4) Swedish currency retained a rela-
tively high purchasing power in
inter-national markets.'* 1
He says further that,
"Sweden's import surplus of 114
millions of kronor in 1930 was more
than covered by the invisible items,
leaving approximately a hundred
millions for investment abroad. "2
The short term funds which were coming into Sweden the
bank used to finance commodity exports and imports of
securities. By the end of 1930 Sweden had foreign
claims and obligations amounting to 400 million kronor.
Foreigners sent their funds to Sweden because they con-
sidered it a safe place for them. As events later
proved the presence of these short-term funds in large
quantities was a most unfortunate circumstance for
Sweden. During 1931 the excess of imports almost
trebled; the decreasing invisible item factor was
^Managed Money, Erik T.H.Kjellstrom,
New York, 1934, p. 20.
2Ibid, p. 21.
-w.
.
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unable to make up for this difference and payment had
to be made by giving up claims on capital abroad.
The absence of tariff restrictions and a high wage
scale aggravated the excessive import problem. In
an effort to make Sweden a less attractive place to
which to send foreign funds, the bank on February 6,
1931 lowered the official rate from 3-J- to 3%. That
this was not sufficiently drastic is shown by the fact
that in the first few months of that year, 105 million
of krona of short-term capital came in. Following the
failure of the Austrian Kredit Austalt in May, the Ger-
man Reichbank raised its bank rate from 5% to 15%, and
because of bank failures throughout the country, the
government imposed severe foreign exchange restrictions.
There was widespread lack of confidence and many coun-
tries called upon Sweden for their short-term funds be-
cause their money was so frozen in Germany that they were
obliged to call every other available loan. As a result
Sweden returned 216 million kronor in June, July and
August of that year; this jroved to be a great drain on
the bank of Sweden* s resources.
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Efforts to Save the Gold Standard.
In July to try to check the efflux of capital which
the bank anticipated, the bank rate was raised from 3%
to 4%; on September 1st it was raised to 5%, and on the
25th to 6%. This had almost the opposite effect of that in-
tended because foreign investments in Sweden continued to
be withdrawn by investors, who wanted their funds regard-
less of the bank rate and a high rate did not, of course,
attract new funds. On the 21st of the month England sus-
pended specie payments and because it had been the policy
of the Swedish government to let the kronor follow the
pound, distrust in the kronor grew and foreign investments
were withdrawn more rapidly than ever. From the 21st to
the 26th gold and capital holdings in Sweden decreased by
100 million krona. The stock exchange was closed to de-
crease the demand for foreign exchange through imports
of securities. Applications for a loan were made to
hew York and Fanis. New York refused to make funds avail-
able for Sweden's use. Meantime gold holdings had dropped
to 38 million krona which was getting near the point at
which convertibility of notes would be out of the question.
Sweden under a Managed Currency System
So a meeting was called of the governors of the
hanks of Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. All but
'
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Sweden made it clear that they intended to remain on
gold; Sweden, however, felt that it was wisest to re-
lieve the bank from obligation of redemption of notes
in gold and to prohibit the export of gold. At the
time it announced that its future policy would be that
of stabilizing the purchasing power ofnthe kronor.
Since Sweden* s gold supply was insufficient either to
maintain the gold standard or to "tie" the kronor to some
gold currency, her choice of action was limited.
Usually from a national point of view a managed currency
is preferable to a currency system in which the unit is
tied to another currency on the theory that undesirable
conditions in the foreign center might influence con-
ditions at home undesirably. The abandonment of the
gold standard was accompanied by a rise in the discount
rate from 6% to 8%. This was calculated to dispell any
fear on the part of the Swedish people that they were to
be subjected to the ravages of a depreciated currency;
also it was intended to prevent a rapid drop in the value
of the kronor on the exchange markets. The rise of the
bank rate was successful in accomplishing the first al-
though it was scarcely necessary as the Swedish public
received the news of Sweden *s abandonment of the gold
standard with their usual calm; but it was not success-
*
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ful in accomplishing the second. Because they were
primarily interested in protecting the value of the
kronor the authorities of the bank sold foreign exchange.
Because they sold foreign exchange in large quantities,
late in 1931 they had but 19 million krona, though at
the end of the year it had increased to 49 millions.
Meantime gold had been going out in such large quanti-
ties that the gold reserves reached 206 million krona
in November of that year. The bank began to purchase
gold to fatten their gold holdings. There was little
change in either amount of currency in circulation or in
the price level during this year. In 1932 the monetary
program was revised. The Minister of Finance urged that
the bank bring abouu stability of the kronor on the ex-
change by avoiding inflation and by stimulating domestic
production by effecting a rise in prices, but warned that
the price rise would have to be gradual so as not to be
too radical a change from the existing cost of living.
The bank, in accord with the plan, lowered the discount
rate to 6%, then to 5^% on February 19, and to 5% on
March 3 where it remained until May 17
,
when it fell to
4'2"%. In June it was reduced to 4% and in August to 3%.
Because of the relative security of Sweden as a place
for foreign funds, Sweden's holdings of foreign exchange
.
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increased rapidly during 1932. The price raising
policy of the banks was not immediately very successful
for prices fell until 1933, though after that the abso-
lute price level rose fairly rapidly. At the same time
the demand for loans and rediscounts declined so that
prices actually remained fairly stable. it was a ques-
tion of one price divergence counter-balancing another.
xn 1933 the money rates remained low; loans
and discounts in the commercial market continued to de-
cline; the kronor in the international market enjoyed
considerable stability as compared with the pound and
dollar; but prices fell again. To alleviate this
situation it was decided that credit should be easy
to obtain and that government short-term treasury bills
-would be particularly easy to rediscount at the bank.
So stimulated ’was production and trade by this easy
credit policy that conditions began to improve and
during the second half of 1933 unemployment decreased
noticeably. The foreign trade balance became favorable;
also exports exceeded imports and with the proceeds the
government bought gold. With these changes, prices -
especially wholesale - tended to rise and the bank in-
creased its foreign capital holdings from 3 to 184
millions. The most advisable course to follow seemed
'
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to be special concentration on the internal situation
along with careful attention to the value of the kronor
on the exchanges. The low rates of interest continued,
for in September 1936 the money in circulation totalled
853,380,124 crowns which was the highest amount on record
with the exception of December 21, 1818.1 Obviously
private individuals and corporations felt that earnings
on deposits was not sufficient to justify placing them
at the banks and they kept them in cash. Further no
large bond issues have been floated which would tend to
keep interest rates low. The increasing independence
of the kronor from the pound is shown in what Commercial
Attache Charles E. Dickerson, Jr. wrote from Stockholm
on June 6, 1936:
"Even if the London Bank rate
should be raised, as is not improb-
able, it would not necessarily exert
any influence in Sweden. The purely
psychological relation of Swedish and
British interest rates should gradually
disappear." 2
He says too in issue No . 230 of the European Financial
Notes, that the "treasury is in an exceptionally liquid
condition."
Discussion of Sweden* s Progress under
the New Monetary System
The plan of managing the currency seems to be
1
Department of Commerce Publication, No. 230,
European Financial Notes.
Ibid, No. 222, p. 22.
2
.
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fairly successful; prices have failed to react to
treatment as it was hoped as is shown in Table I,
though it can be seen that the desired stability of
prices has been accomplished. And as we have seen,
deflation was avoided, likewise excessive currency and
credit inflation, and the internal purchasing power of
the kronor has been reasonably steady. According to
Kjellstrom, the bank uses the following methods to manage
its currency:
1. Changes in the official bank rate.
2. Transactions in the foreign market.
3. Buying and selling of gold at home and
abroad
.
4. Purchases of government bonds.
One (1) is by far the most important of these measures,
though the policy of the bank has always been to keep the
rate low and to make changes in the rate only when absolute-
ly becessary. Two 42 ) is of much less significance as a
factor of managing the money than it is in this country or
in England, though it was resorted to in 1931. Three (3)
and Four (4) are of less importance in managing the currency
and depend upon government policy in regard to the require-
ments of the banks as far as reserves are concerned.
Sweden's policy for making changes in the discount
rate is based quite largely on an index number of wholesale
and retail prices which is compiled by the statistical de-
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'.Cable 1. Showing Sweden’s Stable Price i<evel
Compared wit h America 1 s Unstable Price Level (1)
T±) After Reflation, ./hat i Irving Pisher
Lew York 1934 Chart 7 p.91
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partment; the bank also employs index numbers computed
by other agencies. This composite number is probably
as accurate as an index number can ever be
,
since it is
constantly subjected to a process of resampling and in-
cludes such varied items as foreign quotations of prices
and quotations of Swedish imports and exports. It is
impossible, of course, to say exactly how much credit
for the stable price level is to be attributed to the
price index or to the bank’s manipulation of the dis-
count rate on the basis of it. That there is a connec-
tion between the two cannot be doubted, but it must not
be assumed, as Fisher assumes, that were the United States
to adopt an exactly similar system that it would meet any
thing like the success that it lias met in Sweden. As
has been indicated, the two countries are faced with
different kinds of problems. And in addition, can it
be taken as a fact that stable internal price level is
the goal toward which all economic and banking efforts
are to be directed? Sweden, as a fairly isolated country,
might prosper under such a plan, but where foreign trade
is an important factor as with the larger countries, a
policy of this kind depends on conditions in foreign
markets. Industries which must meet foreign competi-
tion do better to let prices for their products fluctuate
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as natural economic factors dictate than to have them
ordered and regulated because of nationalistic policy
so that they no longer reflect conditions in the outside
world. England* s policy has been to concentrate atten-
tion on external conditions and to let internal price
level, discount rates and other financial affairs take
care of themselves.
'
51
GREAT BRITAIN
History of the Gold Standard in Great Britain
The Bank of England was founded in July 1694.
Since that time it has grown in strength and become the
bank for other banks and the financial agent of the state.
But in contrast to the Bank of Sweden it has never been
a government institution, though its first act 'was to make
a loan of 1,200,000 pounds to the government. The ori-
ginal charter granted it the right to receive deposits,
and to lend deposits out at whatever interest it could
get, but it was forbidden to borrow or owe more than the
amount of its capital under penalty of private liability
on the part of its directors and governors. The gold
guinea had been increasing in popularity with the depre-
ciation of the silver coins, though during the latter half
of the Seventeenth Century trade had been suffering through
a scarcity of money. To meet this situation the money
changers and goldsmiths and the Bank of England issued
notes which were readily accepted. In 1717 the gold
guinea was replaced by the sovereign and the former re-
mained only as a money of account. The Bank of Eng-
land's charter was renewed in 16S7 and again in 1708
when it was granted the monopoly of Joint Stock Banking
in England# Pressure for the right to establish joint
.
stock banks outside grew, however, until in 1826 the
right v/as granted to organize joint stock banks if
outside a radius of sixty-five miles from London.
Between 1783 and 1819 the Bank of England
issued so much paper to meet the needs of trade be-
cause metal had flowed out in large quantities just
prior to that period to finance the Napoleonic wars
that there was a scarcity of coin. The difficulty
of over-expansion of paper resulted from two causes:
The Bank of England notes circulated only in and
around London so that the rest of the country had to
use bills of private bankers who had very little
capital; the importance of convertibility was not
yet appreciated even by the directors of the bank.
Thus from 1800 to 1819 England had depreciated incon-
vertible paper currency; this v/as so unsatisfactory
from every standpoint that the Act of 1816 was passed
which marked the real adoption of the gold standard.
This act did not bring into existence the gold standard
as such but rather abolished bimetallism, though it
provided for free coinage of silver and legal tender
of that metal up to 40 shillings. From 1816 until
the Y/orld Y/ar the gold standard so established remained
practically unaltered, though in 1870 an act was passed
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regarding the specifications of the various coins and
defining the powers of the sovereign to deal with the
coinage. In 1826 and 1829 the Bank of England opened
provincial branches; in 1834 a joint stock bank was
started in London though the act authorizing its estab-
lishment refused it the right of issuing notes. The
Bank of England opposed the bank as bitterly as it had
opposed the small provincial banking institutions. it
was perfectly justified in its attitude toward the latter,
as they were unsound and were obliged to close during minor
panics to the great disadvantage of trade and business.
The Bank Act of 1844 provided:
(1) Notes under 5 pounds were to be prohibited.
(2) The Issue Department of the Bank of Eng-
land was to be kept entirely distinct
from the Banking Department.
(3) Notes to the extent of 11,015,000 might
be issued against the debt owing by the
government to the Bank and against other
securities
,
but coin and bullion had to
be deposited in the Issue Department
against every note issued in excess of
that sum.
The Bank of England by 1844 had a monopoly of note
issuance in and around London. The Act of 1844, there-
fore
,
accomplished at least in part what its framers had
in mind, to avert price rises by preventing an over-
issuance of paper in times of great prosperity. Exper-
.
ience taught the bank the caution it should exercise
in regard to the discount rates and the care with which
it should scrutinize its investments and the security
offered for loans. This knowledge gained from the ex-
perience in numerous panics which occurred in the middle
Nineteenth Century has made the Bank of England foremost
as a sound financial center and first as the model which
the rest of the world has emulated. This was learned
not only by the Bank of England but also by the joint
stock banks which, though opposed by the Bank, were so
well adapted to the needs of the growing country that
they prospered in spite of this opposition and a most
inauspicious beginning-. They spread gradually all over
the country, establishing branches here and there. By
1870 there were 110 banks operating in England, Scotland
and Ireland as separate institutions. Since 1870 the
tendency has been for banks to consolidate and to become
branches of one central institution. In 1922 there
were 39 banks having 9650 branches
,
of which 6800 belonged
to 5 banks alone . In 1929 the number of banks had been
reduced to 29 with a total of 10,000 branches. As in
Sweden, the tendency has been to reduce the number of
banking institutions. In England at the present time
there are five large banks controlling over 67% of total
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deposits in the country. The Bank of England acts
as their bank, holding for them all currency reserves
above what they need for till purposes.
From 1822 to 1914 England maintained the gold
standard. But as history has shown, the Bank of Eng-
land, which was the central financial power of the Em-
pire
,
gradually evolved methods of controlling this
system so that maximum stability would result. Sir
Charles Morgan-Webb in The Money Revolution claims
that this gold standard was in every sense a managed
money currency. He says:
“The financial power of the British
Government, the whole weight of Britain's
strong creditor position in the world,
the immense volume of British interna-
tional commerce, the large sums annually
invested by Britain in the more backward
countries
,
were all utilized in this
elaborate scheme of currency management.
Such management was concentrated on the
one main objective, the stabilization of
the price of gold at the sterling figure." 1
As we shall see later, when England was obliged
to leave the gold standard, the price of gold was no
longer a factor of such great significance. Under the
pre-War system, gold determined the value of the unit;
under a pure managed currency system, the value of the
unit is determined by a combination of several factors.
1
The Money Revolution, Sir Charles Morgan-Webb,
New York, 1935, p. 49.

The MacMillan report listed five methods of control
which the Bank of England had at its disposal in
managing the gold standard. As we shall see, certain
of these methods are the basis of England’s present
management. These methods are listed by the report
as follows t-L
(1) The bank rate.
(2) Open market operations (that is
the purchase and sale of securi-
ties) undertaken to influence
the amount of the reserves of
the commercial banks, and their
power of creating bankers’ money.
(3) Open market operation, undertaken
to influence the London Money
Market
.
(4) Gold exchange methods, dealing in
foreign exchanges and in forward
exchange
,
and variations in the
price of gold within the narrow
limits permitted.
(5) Personal influence or advice, such
as the so-called embargo on for-
eign loans.
Of these the first was far the most important, the
other four being subsidiary methods, employed usually
to avoid making substantial changes in the first.
1
The Money Revolution, Sir Charles Morgan-Webb,
New York, 1935, p. 49.
.'
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War-Time Inflation in England
With the outbreak of the World War it became
evident that England would have to use the strictest
economy in the matter of gold. She was making many
purchases abroad which called for shipments of gold;
her invisible item credits fell off on account of war
conditions. The need for additional notes came into
existence because wages rose as both cause of and re-
sult of the price rise which occurred immediately with
the opening of hostilities. To elleviate this situa-
tion the Currency and Bank Notes Act was passed provid-
ing for the issuance of one pound and two pound notes
which were to circulate freely and to be legal tender
to any amount. There was no restriction placed on
the number of these which could be issued and the Act
did not set up any reserve for them. The framers of
the Act had hoped that the amount of these notes could
be limited by refusing to distribute them to the banks
in quantities which exceeded 20% of their deposit lia-
bilities. But soon a minute was added to the Act to
allow any person presenting the Bank of England the
face value to receive these notes in exchange.
The amount of notes so given out were to be carried
..
.
.
_
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in a separate account called the Currency Note Redemption
Account. The difficulty of this plan was this. A man
could go to the bank, borrow, and with the credit so
obtained, secure notes. Thus the only limit to the
quantity of notes so issued was the amount of credit
the banks wanted to extend. By the end of 1914 the
amount of securities and bills held by the bank reached
121 million pounds as opposed to 42 million pounds be-
fore the passage of the Act. During the same period
other deposits rose from 54 million pounds to 128
million pounds with reserves falling from 50% to 8%. 1
The ree.1 danger of this situation lay in the fact that
the public did not appreciate the fact that the paper
unit was no longer defined in terms of gold, but that
a certain weight of gold was defined as being equal to
a certain amount of paper money.
In addition gold coins ceased to circulate;
people hoarded them since they passed at a premium or
else melted them down to get the profits to be ob-
tained by selling them to the Bank in the form of
bullion. To remedy this situation the Defence of
the Realm Act was passed in December 1916 which made
1
Great Britain and the Gold Standard,
H. F. Frayer, London, 1933.
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this practice illegal said imposed penalties on those
guilty of it. At the same time propaganda was spread
about the country to the effect that "he who hoards gold,
keeps the enemy." To further protect the gold supply
the War Risk Insurance scheme was put through which made
shipments of gold so costly that it amounted almost to
an embargo on gold exports. In 1917 the government was
forced to prohibit exports of gold altogether. Meantime
the English government was buying gold from South Africa
at the old rate and at the same time using up credit bal-
ances in the United States to keep the exchange rate of
the pound below the export point. An examination of
the following table shows the drop in sterling exchange
after the passage of the Currency Act of 1914. It also
reflects the efforts of the Bank to keep the exchange
rates up.
Year Pounds in
1913 $4.87
1914 4.91
1915 4.75
1916 4.75
1917 4.76
1918 4.75
1919 4.43
1920 3 . 66
^1936 Supplement to Survey on Current Business,
U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington
,
1936, p.52
.
That some such action must have been taken is obvious.
Since England went off the gold standard in 1914 and
her money depreciated in terms of gold, sterling ex-
change would have dropped at once in terms of a gold
currency such as the dolla.r. That it did fall off in
1919 was due in part to the fact that prices in England
fell; that it did not drop farther was due in part to
the fact that prices in the United States rose as a
result of a deflationary policy on the part of the
government. The indices of prices in England and in
the United States were as follows:
Year England United !
1918 231 206
1919 212 197
1920 313 272
The fall of the pound in terms of the dollar in 1920
may be attributed to the greater relative price rise
in England than in the United States in that year, in
1919 the United States began to pursue a gold purchase
plan, buying largely and directly from South Africa.
The British government at the same time began to grant
licenses for the re-export of gold. The result of
these two actions was to make the value of gold rise
,
I
Money and Foreign Exchange After 1914,
Gustav Cassel, hew York, 1930, p. 190.
*
which was, of course, adverse to the movement of ster-
ling in terms of dollars. In 1920 England was obliged
to renew the prohibition on the export of gold by pass-
ing the Gold and Silver Act .
The Cunliffe Committee
In 1918 the Cunliffe Committee was appointed in
England to consider what could be done to remedy the fi-
nancial situation, a high price level, falling exchange,
low reserve ratios. The recommendation of this commit-
tee was to return to the gold standard at once. in
order to do this, the following steps were advocated:
(1) The Government was to make new loans
and with the proceeds of these loans,
pay off its debts.
(2) The bank discount rate was to be raised
in order to prevent the export of gold
and any further expansion of credit.
(3) The note issues which were not covered
by metal backing- were to be reduced
gradually.
(4) The Bank of England was to adopt a
policy of accumulating as much gold
as possible.
(5) In line with (4) the branch banks
were to turn over to the Bank of
England all their gold reserves.
These proposals were impossible to follow. As
long as high prices continued,as would be the case until
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economic conditions universally were such as to allow
a gradual lowering of the price level
,
any sudden dras-
tic contraction was out of the question. For the govern-
ment to make fresh loans in order to pay off its debts
involved simply the exchange of one debt for another,
though of more desirable character. In addition the
deflationary program recommended by the committee was
so concerned with State finances as to be a very complex
and ticklish one . The proposal to increase the holdings
of gold by the Bank of England was unnecessary, as the
Bank was already pursuing such a policy, and it involved
competition in international markets which England could
scarcely meet at the time. The committee disregarded
the international aspects of the problem, and so made
impossible suggestions. At any rate, these suggestions
were not acted upon at the time though the Committee had
enough prestige to start England thinking about the
possibility of returning to the gold standard, which to
her sorrow she did in 1925.
In 1919 a Treasury minute announced that in 1920
notes would not be issued in excess of 320,600,000
pounds unless backed by gold or Bank of England notes.
Meantime, at the suggestion of Lord D'Aberon, an Inter-
nationa.! Conference was called which met in Brussels in
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late 1920. Little of a constructive nature was accom-
plished at this meeting. It was generally agreed that
a return to the gold standard was out of the question
when every country was trying to deflate and suggestions
were offered for any one interested in deflating. One
of the results of this deflationary program was a general
depression in 1920. Most authorities agree that defla-
tion is not an advisable policy unless conducted generally.
The world* s experience in 1920 seems to have proved this.
The first step in deflation is to restrict credit
;
this
has a paralyzing effect on industry; unemployment in-
creases; people cannot buy; foreign trade stands still.
The only desirable effect is the reduction of prices.
In the United States in 1921 prices were lower than at
any other time during the years 1915 and 1930. Like-
wise foreign trade was lower than in any other year be-
tween 1915 and 1930. On the other hand, discount rates
reached 7%, 2% higher than any other figure from 1918
to 1935. Does the aim justify the accompanying condition?
The Gold Standard Act of 1925
In England the pound fell off in 1920 and 1921,
but thenceforth the exchange situation improved rapidly,
as the following table shows:
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1921 3.85 1926 4.86^
1922 4.43 1927 4.86
1923 4.57 1928 4.87
1924 4.42 1929 4.86
1925 4.83 1930 4.86
Having always in the back of their minds the hope of
returning to the gold standard at the earliest possible
date
,
the England found in this improvement in the ex-
change a most encouraging circumstance. In 1925
therefore a committee which had been appointed to con-
sider the amalgamation of the Treasury and Bank notes
easily persuaded themselves that the time had come to
return to gold. Thus the export, of gold was again
permitted and in his budget speech on April 28, 1925
Mr. Churchill announced definitely that the pound
would be on a gold basis, and in May the Gold Standard
Act was passed. This Act provided that:
(lj Bank notes and currency notes were to
remain legal tender though they were
no longer convertible into gold on
demand
.
(2) Free and unlimited coinage was to be
abolished, the Bank retaining the sole
right to coin.
(3) In order to maintain the purchasing
power parity of the pound at a speci-
fied rate in the exchanges of the
world, the Treasury was empowered
to buy any sums necessary to this end.
1 1936 Supplement to Survey on Business,
p. 52.
«.
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In connection with (3) the government arranged with
the bank for a credit of 300 million pounds , though
this was not immediately necessary as the pound rose
above the gold point.
Discussion of the Advisability of
the Act of 1925
Many people felt that England should not have
taken this step, and prominent among the objectors
were Mr. Keynes and his followers at Cambridge who
wished to stabilize on a paper basis, and those out-
and-out inflationists who realized that inflation was
out of the question with the pound on gold. The sta-
bilizers maintained that the pound was over-valued ex-
ternally; the advocates of the Act conceded this but
felt confident that price rises in gold standard coun-
tries would shortly cause the disappearance of this
over-valuation. This over-valuation was the result
principally of two factors:
(1) Investors and speculators had been
anticipating England’s return to gold
for some time and so had placed funds
in London so that they might enrich
themselves by profits made from the
sale of these funds. They bought
pounds at less than $4.86, expecting
a rise; they sold them at $4.86 or
more when the pound rose . This
«*
.
.
.
activity naturally increased the demand
for pounds
,
and hence
,
helped push up
their price.
(2) Prices in the United States had been
rising (according to Bradstreet, the
index was 87.2 in 1921 and climbed to
108 in 1925) . The effect of this was
to decrease the dollar value on the
exchanges with a proportionate rise
in the pound value
.
England certainly suffered from this over-valuation
internally and as far as foreign trade was concerned.
But judged simply by the exchange rates, 1925 was a
good time to return to gold, but judged by the pre-
vailing price levels in England and in the rest of
the world, the return to gold involved too many ad-
justments to justify the harm from such action.
Perhaps no group had more strongly opposed this than
the Federation of British Industries; a year before
the Gold Standard Act they had prophesied the serious
dislocation of trade and industry and the fall in
prices and increase in the real burden of the National
debt which this action would bring about. As events
turned out, real incomes were reduced by 10%, the
National debt was increased by 700 million pounds
,
and exports were handicapped. These disastrous
effects did not prove temporary but seemed to be
.
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of a permanent nature
.
The years 1S25 to 1931, which the MacMillan re-
port called the years of "very abnormal character”
,
Sir Morgan-Webb
,
in The Rise and Fall of the Gold
Standard , divides into two periods: 1925-1928 when
the dollar and pound, the two gold standard currencies,
struggled for supremacy, and 1928-1931 when the franc
entered the scene. Keynes held that since England was
a debtor of the United States
,
the return to gold made
the pound a “vassal” to the dollar. Not only did Eng-
land owe the United States money, but she was forced to
make purchases from the latter country which could be
paid for only in gold because of a high Protectionist
policy which the United States had adopted. This
tended to drain England of her gold. In 1928 France
adopted the gold standard, contributing a currency de-
valued 80%. England found her gold drifting toward
France in the same manner as had been the case with the
United States. During 1929-1930 England lost 150
million pounds in gold and was forced to raise her dis-
count rate to 6-2-%, which was ruinous to trade and in-
dustry. The discount rate had been kept low because
of internal problems
,
unemployment for example
.
Meantime
,
France was profiting by the fact that she
.
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had depreciated her currency. The franc dropped from
$.193 where it stood in 1913, to $.039 the following year,
a value it maintained until 1933. Prices fell in France,
with increase in commodity exports and gold imports; Eng-
land tore the brunt of France^ prosperity.
The Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928
and the MacMillan Commission
Because conditions were serious, various attempts
were made in England to introduce some plan to alleviate
them. The Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928 was
passed by Parliament providing that all currency notes
should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Bank of
England. This amalgamation of treasury and bank notes
resulted in the disappearance of treasury notes from cir-
culation since it v/as the purpose of the Bank to withdraw
them gradually.
The next year the MacMillan Commission was ap-
pointed in an effort to study the situation in the bank-
ing, finance and economic fields. In June 1931 the Com-
mission issued a significant report to Parliament. it
proposed a Price Index standard to currency; it recommend-
ed that:

"The aim of the Central Banks should
be to maintain the stability of interna-
tional prices.”
1
The report defined "international prices" as
follows
:
"We mean by the international price
level in this context, the composite price
level at wholesale of the principal food
stuffs and raw materials entering into
international trade as measured by the
best-known wholesale index numbers. "2
It offered the following general suggestions for
carrying out the proposal:
"The method by which the Central Banks
must attempt to achieve their aim of main-
taining stability of the international price
level over long and short periods is through
the control of the volume and terms of
bank credit.” 3
And incidentally , the Report recommended the
establishment of an Exchange Equalization Fund to regu-
late the exchange value of the pound. The committee
suggested that 100,000,000 pounds to 175,000,000 pounds
be set aside for this purpose. Acting upon this
suggestion, 150,000,000 pounds were added to the
150,000,000 already held by the Bank as reserve. Later
the Exchange Equalization Fund was increased to 350
million pounds making a total of 500 million pounds
,
MacMillan Report cited in The Money Revolution .
Sir Morgan-Webb
,
New York, 1S35, p. 146.
2 Ibid, p. 148.
3 Ibid, p. 149.
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of which 150 million pounds are held in gold and the
rest (which constitutes the Exchange Equalization Fund)
in sterling paper or foreign exchange. More will be
said of the success of this step later.
Obviously the MacMillan Committee did not feel
that the gold standard alone was sufficient to bring
about the desired stability; this fact was attributed
to maldistribution of gold, the degree to which some
countries had become debtors, and others , creditors , and
the disequilibriums in internal affairs brought on by
the War. The MacMillan Report caused considerable
comment at the time of its publication but was not
acted upon at that time except in the matter of the
proposed exchange Equalization Fund.
Breakdown of the Gold Standard in 1931
It was but three months later that England was
obliged to go off the gold standard. The immediate
cause of this breakdown in 1S31 was the drastic finan-
cial condition in the continent which produced such a
drain on England's gold supply that convertibility of
notes became impossible and the gold standard could no
longer be supported. What the European countries
asked in the two months, July and August, was 200
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million pounds in gold which was in excess of the
entire gold reserves held by the Bank. In spite of
130 million pounds which she was able to borrow, the
strain was too much. The real causes of the break-
down were of an economic nature. (1) Rigidity of an
internal economic system which could not adjust itself
to banking policies which the authorities were obliged
to adopt. (2) Over-valuation of the pound in 1925
which resulted in decreased exports and increased im-
ports. (3) A discount rate which was high in order
to correct the adverse trade balance when it should
have been low to benefit industry. (4) An unbsJLanced
budget. (5) High wage and income scale. The break:
with gold caused the pound to fall from 4.86 in 1930
to 4.53 in 1931 and to 3.51 in 1932, in terms of dollars.
Shortly after this happened the Ottawa Conference
met to frame a currency sustem which was to take the
place of the gold standard. The decision of this group
may be summarized as follows:
(1) The world wholesale price level ought
to be raised (this should be the main
and immediate objective of all proposals,
agreed the members.)
(2) The ultimate objective should be sta-
bility of prices at a new high level.
(3) This raising of prices should be accom-
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plished by lowering rates of interest
and making available an abundance of
short-term money. (This, of course,
placed a restriction in the actions
of the Bank of England and precluded
any return to the gold standard.)
(4) Stabilization of international ex-
changes should be accomplished by
price policies common to all countries.
The Ottawa Conference agreed with the MacMillan Report
that the gold standard was not adequate and attacked it
on the three counts
,
namely,
(1) as a wasteful end disturbing regula-
tion of the international rates of exchange,
(2) as an obstacle to the low re.tes of inter-
est essential for industrial prosperity,
(3) As an inefficient and fluctuating standard
of value. 1
Certainly England had suffered enough in trying to maintain
her gold standard to be justified in condemning it.
The Y/orld Economic Conference of 1933
The latest attempt at securing world, co-operation
in currency and monetary affairs was the World Economic
Conference which met in London in 1933. It failed to
accomplish what it set out to accomplish. Various
reasons are given for this failure. President Roosevelt
The Monetary Revolution, Sir Morgan-Webb
,
New York, 1935, p. 175.
«.
announced almost before the Conference got under way
that the United States would not agree to any schemes
for stabilization in which the dollar was involved;
France refused participation unless England and the
United States were prepared to return to gold, which
they were not; the Ottawa policy had been a success
and was contrary to what most of the delegates to the
Conference were trying to put through. The world was
not yet ready to come to any understanding , for every
country had so many troubles of its own as to be com-
pletely nationalistic in its attitude and unwilling to
co-operate for universal good. But there grew up out
of the Conference what was called the British Empire
Currency Declaration which said:
"In the meantime the undersigned
delegations recognize the importance
of the stability of exchange rates be-
tween countries of the Empire in the
interests of trade." 1
They confirmed the Ottawa group’s proposal to achieve
this stability by means of a common price policy. In
the light of England’s ultimate goad, the Declaration
went on to say:
"The undersigned Delegations now
reaffirm their view that the ultimate
aim of monetary policy should be the
restoration of a satisfactory interna-
tional gold standard, under which
international cooperation would be
Cited in The Monetary .Revolution, Sir Charles
Morgan-Webb, New York, 1935, p. 1S7.
1
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.
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secured and maintained, with a view to
avoiding, so far as may be found practi-
cable
,
undue fluctuations in the purchas-
ing power of gold. 1 ’ 1
England under "Managed Currency” System
In summarizing England’s present system of cur-
rency management we find that control of the interna-
tional currency is effected by means of the Exchange
Equalization Fund and that control of purchasing pov/er
of the pound is effected by increasing or decreasing the
amount of credit. The theory of the Equalization Fund
is that the value of the pound on the exchanges under
a managed currency system can be increased or decreased
by altering the relative demand and supply of the pound.
Therefore, if the pound is falling, the Bank buys ster-
ling with the credit in the Equalization account, there-
by increasing the demand for sterling and increasing the
price. Selling the pounds has the opposite effect.
Thus the exchange value of sterling can be very neatly
stabilized. The internal price level is kept steady
chiefly by raising or lowering the bank rate and by the
engagement on the part of the Bank in the purchase and
sale of government securities in the open market. The
1 Cited in The Money Revolution, Sir Charles
Morgan-Webb, hew York, 1S35, p. 198.
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latter method of controlling the amount of credit is
increasing in importance. This is in contrast to the
Swedish system where the discount rate is the chief
means of control, but similar to the United States
where open market operations are used quite as much
as the change in the rediscount rate. With England
greater attention is probably given to the pound on
the exchanges than is the case with Sweden or the
United States, since trade is a greater item in her
national economy than in that of the other two coun-
tries.
..
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THE UNITED STATES
The Early Monetary History of the United States
The experience of the United States with a
national currency dated from 1776 when Continentals
were issued to finance the Revolutionary War. The
issues of Continentals were authorized up to about
$240,0C0,0G0, each dollar backed by the security of
the Colonies. This security was such a questionable
affair, however, that by the end of the War the dollar's
had depreciated to such an extent that in 1780 one Conti-
nental was equal to cents. In 1890 they were called
in and redeemed at the ra.te of 100:1. The Act of 1792
caused the United States to adopt a double standard at
a ratio of 15:1 for gold and silver. This ratio over-
valued silver to such an extent that gold coins were
driven from circulation. To remedy this situation the
Act of 1834 was passed on June 28 of that year. This
Act established a ratio of 16:1 between silver and gold,
which caused gold to be over-valued and silver to disap-
pear from circulation. In 1837 the ratio was changed
to 15.988:1, where it has remained ever since. In
1857 foreign coins which had hitherto circulated at par
and as legal tender, were banned and Congress provided
..
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for the issuance of 6% Treasury Notes up to the amount
of $20,000,000, and two years later these Treasury Notes
were authorized to be re-issued and over $30,000,000 in
addition. In 1861 Congress authorized the issuance of
not more than $50,000,000 demand notes, and in 1862
$10,000,000 additional issuance. The Act of 1862 made
these notes legal tender for all debts. The Act of
1863 created the National Banking System and authorized
banks which were members of this system to issue notes
up to 90% of the market value of the United States bonds
which they had deposited with the United States Treasury.
Notes so issued could not exceed $300,000,000. State
banks could also issue notes upon deposit of bonds.
In 1865 an attempt was made to drive out of circulation
state bank notes by means of a 10% tax. In 1875 the
Resumption Act was passed which provided for resumption
of specie payments. The Bland Allison Act of 1878 re-
monetized silver, made silver coins legal tender and
provided for purchase of silver bullion by the Treasury.
The Sherman Silver Purchase Act twelve years later further
directed the Secretary of the Trea.sury to buy silver, in
1893 this Act was repealed.
..
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Establishment of the Gold Standard
The Act of 190C is referred to as the Gold
Standard Act. This act declared gold to be the stan-
dard unit of value
,
set up a fund in the Treasury with
which to redeem notes in gold and to buy gold bullion
with notes, allowed gold certificates to be counted as
reserve by National Banks, and placed a minimum of
$100,000,000 upon the fund in the Treasury for the
issuance of gold certificates. The Aldrich-Vreelend
Act in 1S08 provided for additional National Bank notes
up to $500,000,000 but imposed a tax on their issuance
with a view to contracting them at an early date.
Establishment of the Federal Reserve System
In 1913 the Federal Reserve System was established.
The chief purpose of this Act was to provide an elastic
currency which would contract or expand according to the
needs of business. Under the National Banking- System,
when notes were issued, they continued to circulate whe-
ther required by trade or not; the result was, obvious-
ly, that price rises and falls were completely uncon-
trollable and that depressions and panics in the economic
world were aggravated because of the inflexibility of the
*
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monetary unit. The Federal Reserve Bank notes as issued
under this 1913 Act were expected to serve business better
than the National Bank notes because they were not to be
limited in amount by the resources of any particular bank
nor affected by local conditions but were to be available
when and where needed and to be depended upon by virtue
of their connection with a strong centralized banking
system.
W . Randolph Burgess has said that:
”Under the Reserve System the burden
of meeting the fluctuations in the de-
mands for funds has been shifted from
the reserves of member banks to the re-
serve of the Reserve Banks, whose re-
sources are adequate to meet almost any
emergency.” 1
He also stated that:
"The presence of the Reserve System
gives greater elasticity to the supply
of funds and stability to the money mar-
ket and removes the fear of money panics
Every FederaJ. Reserve Bank was obliged to hold in
gold at least 40% of its federal reserve notes in cir-
culation, at least 5> of which had to be held as gold
Redemption Fund in the United States Treasury. The
remaining- 60% of the value of the Federal Reserve notes
^ The Reserve Banks and the Money Market,
W. Randolph Burgess
,
New York, 1927, p. 124.
Ibid, p. 125.2
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outstanding could consist of gold, gold certificates
or eligible paper. 1 The act dictated the reserve
requirements for note issues but created the Federal
Reserve Board which had vast power in dictating what
should be the discount rate and what should be the re-
quirements of pa.per in order to be eligible as backing
for currency and what should be the policy of the bank-
ing system in regard to open market operations. Plain
it is, then, that the Federal Reserve ^oard had consid-
erable control over all phases of our financial life;
good judgment on the part of its members was of para-
mount importance. If the Board considered that expan-
sion of credit, which in this instance, may be thought
of as synonymous with currency, was getting out of hand,
it could affect a contraction by raising the discount
rate
,
which made it more difficult for banks to secure
paper eligible as backing for Federal Reserve Rotes, by
raising- the requirements of the paper which the Central
banks could discount - thus reducing the amount of paper
held by the individual banks to be used in the 60% limi-
tation, or by buying government bonds which reduced the
holdings of securities in the portfolios of the member
banks which they were using as backing- for their notes.
"Eligible Paper" included notes, drafts, bills
of exchange in acceptances discounted or
purchased in the open market by the Federal
Reserve Banks.
••
Conversely, a low discount policy, a broadening of the
specifications for the eligibility of paper, or the sale
of government bonds automatically increased the member
banks' ability to extend credit and issue notes at the
same time remaining within the law. This, in brief,
was the means by which the advocates of the Federal Re-
serve System hoped to manage the currency of the country.
Effect of the World War on the Monetary
System of the United States
But hardly had the system been inaugurated when
the World War broke out and put the new plan to a severe
test. Being a producer country and neutral for the
first two years of the war, the United States was called
upon to make tremendous sales to Europe. Europe was
willing to pay dearly for these purchases and there was
competition between European countries for American goods.
But this competition was necessary only for a short time,
for American industry expanded almost immediately to meet
the new demands made upon it. And even after the United
States was equipped to produce in the necessary quantities,
prices for goods remained high. These high prices meant
huge profits for manufacturers and ultimately for the
entire citizenry. The result was a general price rise
*•
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in all consumers' and producers' goods. Bra.dstreet
gives the following price indices:
Dunn's
1914 68.
9
1
1915 77.4
1916 93.3
1917 123.8
1918 145.2
1919 145.6
was:
1914 64.
8
2
1915 67.6
1916 80.3
1917 110.5
1918 121.9
1919 123.2
United States exports increased greatly and imports
increased only slightly during- the War years. The
following table shows this:
Year Exports imports
1914 46 46
1915 78 46
.1916 120 62
1917 137 76
1918 135 78
1919 174 101
The European countries paid for their purchases by
means of shipments of gold to the United States, until
they had reduced their stocks of gold to a dangerously
low level. After this time they were obliged to borrow
from us to pay for the goods they bought. By virtue
1936 Supplement to Survey of Current Business,
United States Department of Commerce
,
Washing-ton, D. C., 1936, p. 15
Ibid, p. 65.
2
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o±' the fact that prices had soared due to unnatural
industrial activity, the i-ederal reserve Board felt it
to be unwise to use the tremendous amounts of gold
which were being received into this country as a basis
for further extension of credit since a policy of this
sort would increase prices still more, oo the gold was
•'sterilized"- that is, allowed to remain idle in the vaults
of the federal Reserve Banks. This sterilization policy
has been followed since that time and tne federal Reserve
Bank and the United Btates government have been criti-
cized by European countries on account of it. foreign
writers have claimed that the United states has taken
out of use so much gold because of this policy that the
gold standard has had to oe abandoned by other countries.
They obviously overlook the fact that had this gold been
allowed to back further credit expansion, even greater
price rises would have taken place than did take place,
and while the United states would have been most immed-
iately affected, the entire world would have suffered
ultimately. ihe deflationary policies which all
countries found it expedient to adopt after the Uar
would have had to be the more drastic and upsetting on
this account. The United states should not be criti-
cized for its sterilization program but it can be blamed

84 .
for insisting on gold payments. This insistence on
gold did not take the form of a threat to the effect
"If you do not pay in gold, we will not sell goods to
you," but rather took the form of protective tariffs
which made it impossible for foreign countries to ex-
port to the United States, thereby building up credit
balances which could be used up in payment of goods
bought. When the European countries found it neces-
sary to restrict the outflow of gold, they borrowed,
as has been indicated. Thus between 1917 and 1919
there was relatively little shipment of gold. The
United States had found it necessary in 1917 to give
to the Federal reserve Board authority to restrict the
export of coin, bullion and currency to foreign countries
and in the Trading with the Enemy Act of the same year,
which amended the previous legislation, to give to the
President discretionary powers over hoarding and melt-
ing of gold coins and bullion. As we have seen, both
England and Sweden legislated similarly, likewise France,
Germany and other powers. But most of the restrictions
so passed were lifted in 1919. Lifting restrictions here
resulted in a flow of gold from the United States to neutral
countries from which it had bought raw materials. Lifting
restrictions in other countries meant that after 1920 gold
*
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flowed in again from Europe to the United States so that
between 1920 and 1924 more than $1,500,000,000 in gold
came into the United States. But because of the ster-
ilization of gold and the use of Federal credit, this
great increase in metal backing was not allowed to affect
prices. The use of the new form of bank credit was em-
ployed chiefly during the export of gold in 1919.
Mr. Burgess says:
•’This may be put another way by
saying that during this period, from
1917 to the end of 1921, Federal Re-
serve credit acted as a kind of cushion
between gold movements and bank deposits. 1,1
Thus the Federal Reserve system had introduced a monetary
unit which was more independent of gold than any unit
preceding it which was, at the same time, tied to gold.
The years 1920 to 1924 showed how little the value of
the dollar internally, as indicated by the price level,
or externally as indicated by its exchange value, de-
pended either upon the value of gold or the amount of
gold in the possession of this country. In 1918 the
United States held $2,871,000,000 in gold, in 1924,
$4,152,000,000.2 For those same years money in
circulation amounted to:
^ The Reserve Banks and the Money Market,
W. Randolph Burgess
,
New York, 1929, p. 249.
2. 1936 supplement to the survey of Current Business
U. 3 . department of Commerce .»ashington 1936 p.53
:
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1918 4371
1919 4729
1920 6191
1921 4663
1922 4248
1923 4535
1924 4592
in fact, in 1920 when the gold holdings were the low-
est for the period under consideration, $2,582,000,000,
the amount of money in circulation was greatest. Prices
fell from 140.6 in 1S20 to 87.2 in 1921, rising to 108
in 1925 (these are Bradstre ets ) . Prices, therefore,
varied more or less directly with the amount of money
in circulation. Interest rates were extremely high
in 1920, namely 7%, a condition probably resulting
from an effort on the part of banking officials to halt
expansion. In 1921 the rate was reduced to 4.5, in
1922 to 4.0, in 1923 to 3.5, and in 1924 to 3.0, which
was the lowest point before 1930. The attempts at
deflation here and abroad had caused a panic in 1921
and 1922 with resulting low prices and unemployment
and equilibrium was hoped for by renewal of easy credit
terms. These changes were taking place, then, without
any regard for gold movements. Gold had become a neces
sary element only for maintaining the gold standard; the
Federal Heserve system sought to regulate financial con-
^1936 Supplement to the Survey of Current
Business, p. 53.
*
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ditions by other means.
In 1S25 gold exports exceeded gold imports by
$8,510,000. The same condition existed in 1927, 1928,
1931 and 1933. The years in between showed net gold
imports. There has been a gradual increase in the
amount of money in circulation, the greatest increase
coming after 1932. This has been accompanied by an
increasingly low interest rate. The following table
shows this
:
Year Money in Cir-1 Interest Rate 2
culation
1925 4582 3.5
1926 4645 4.0
1927 4605 3.5
1928 4496 5.0
1929 4476 4.5
1930 4245 2.0
1931 4672 3.5
1932 5328 2.5
1933 5576 2.0
1934 5403 1.5
1935 5584 1.5
Prices gradually rose until 1928, falling off
rapidly after that time . Dollar exchange remained
fairly steady up until 1930, any fluctuations in its
value resulting rather from monetary disturbances
abroad than in this country. Though any examina-
^1936 Supplement to the Survey on Current
Business, Washington, D. C., 1936, p. 53.
2 Ibid, p. 47.
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tion of the figures for these various factors would
seem to indicate that gold no longer had any usefulness
beyond its function in settling international balances,
it would be minimizing the importance of gold to judge
solely on the basis of these figures. W. Randolph
Burgess said that "Federal Reserve gold policy found
expression in four ways:
(1) Resistance to secondary expansion.
(2) Putting gold into circulation.
(3) An open-market and discount policy
adjusted to gold movements.
(4) Aid to restoration of the gold stan-
dard abroad.
These policies did not completely sterilize the imported
gold; they tended to reduce its influence and sought to
correct the chief cause, which was unstable currencies
abroad." 1 But it must be acknowledged that these were
of comparatively minor significance . The National in-
dustrial Conference Board publication The New Monetary
System of the United States says that "gold is relegat-
ed to a distinctly nominal role" since "the traditional
right of private individuals .... to test at will the
essential soundness of domestic banking and currency
*^The Reserve Banks and the Money Market,
tf. Randolph Burgess, New York, 1927, p. 253.
•
89 .
in any form into gold on demand ... is definitely
abrogated.”
The vast accumulation of gold which the United
States had made during the years from the War period
up until 1932 would seem to make the action taken in
March of that year unjustifiable. That it is explain-
able from an economic standpoint shows how inter-
dependent are nations in every phase of their economic
and financial life. Not because the United States was
unable to support the existing credit structure and
currency issues from the standpoint of gold holdings,
but because other countries had depreciated their
currencies was the United States obliged to follow this
course. France had depreciated her currency as we have
seen; England decided to give up the fight for gold
standard and depreciate the pound. The gold standard
dollar then bore the burden of supporting both franc
and pound. Under ordinary circumstances in this case
the trade balance of the United States would have
suffered because of relatively high prices. Because
the country was suffering from a great industrial de-
pression, prices fell, according to Bradstreet, from
102.4 in 1928 to 54.3 in 1932, rising slightly after
that. It is entirely probable that they would have
.-
'
.
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fallen more rapidly than they did if we had been off
gold. As it was the trade and industry were handi-
capped in recovery because of high dollar exchange.
In order to overcome the disadvantages of remaining on
gold and in order to try to revive prosperity in this
country, the government had three possibilities open
to it:
(1) To let conditions alone to work them-
selves out as they could.
(2) To alleviate the burdens of the people
by assuming responsibility for their
mortgages and deposits.
(3) To bring about a price rise by going
off the gold standard and offering
a depreciated currency.
The government adopted the third course in expectation
that the profits which would accrue to farmer and in-
dustrialist because of this price rise would make poss-
ible expansion of industry which in turn would solve
the unemployment problem. In how far these aims have
been accomplished is debatable, but that price rise was
the primary object of legislation in 1933 cannot be
doubted.
The events preceding the Emergency Banking Act
may be summarized in brief. The dollar had undergone
selling pressure, following England* s departure from
gold in 1931, to such a high degree that foreign bal-
_
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ances in this country were falling'. 1 Citizens in
this country watched this process with alarm though
there was no reason for alarm and it was a situation
which could be expected. In addition gold was flow-
ing- out in great quantities and this further aggra-
vated the public distrust of the soundness of the bank-
ing system. The outflow of gold was harmless too.
By 1932 the selling pressure on the dollar had ceased
and we had a slight net import of gold in that year.
Toward the end of that year, however, the pound fell
on the exchanges to 3.51 and seemed to be a very
attractive buy. As a result funds resumed their
outward course from New York and gold proceeded to fol-
low. The Federal. Reconstruction Finance Corporation
was established not as a political move but with the
avowed intention of making loans to corporations which
were temporarily insolvent. Paul Einzig in The Ster-
lim-Dollar-Franc Tangle attributes to the fact that
the loans made by this corporation were published,both
as to amounts and recipients, the bank panic of early
1933. Whether or not this was the case, it seems
entirely likely that it was a contributing factor.
Prices did not rise immediately in response to
the depreciation of franc and pound. Therefore
by immediate sales of gold dollars , citizens and
corporations of England and France could exper-
ience additional purchasing power by receiving
more francs and pounds for their dollar holdings
than they had paid for them.
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In any event, the runs on the banks were terrific and
many were caught with insufficient funds to meet their
deposit liabilities. England refused at this critical
point to help matters by counter balancing even in the
slightest the selling pressure against the dollar by
making purchases of dollar exchange as she had done in
1931; instead she pegged the pound to the depreciated
gold franc . Our net exports of gold in 1933 were
$19,390,000, a greater net export than at any previous
period. Directly the government was faced with the
hoarding problem, gold coins had been circulating and
when most banks appeared about to break, these immed-
iately disappeared from general use.
Abandonment of the Gold Standard by the
United States and its Significance
The first action taken by the Roosevelt adminis-
tration was the declaration of a bank holiday during
which time an effort was made to examine all banks and
to allow to open at the end of the time only those which
were definitely sound and solvent. The next act was
the forbidding of all further exportation of gold and
calling all gold into the Treasury. The President act-
ed under authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act in
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this latter move. Technically the United States went
off the gold standard at this time . it was generally
felt that this embargo on gold exports was a temporary
affair and that the gold standard would be restored as
soon as the emergency was passed. But in May 1933
the Inflation Act was passed by Congress giving the
President great powers of credit and currency inflation
if he chose to exercise them. it provided as follows:
(1) The Secretary of the Treasury is to
issue notes up to $3 ,000,000 ,000. to meet
maturing Federal obligations. The
notes are to be retired at the rate
of 4% per annum.
(2) The President is to fix the weights
of gold and silver in such amounts as
he finds necessary and to provide for
unlimited coinage of gold and silver
at the rates so fixed if he thinks it
expedient. He may reduce the gold
content of the dollar by as much as
50% if necessary.
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury is to
buy silver at a price of 50 cents
per ounce up to $200,000,000 from
foreign governments in payments of
debts due the United States.
(4) The Secretary of the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve Board are to agree
that the Federal Reserve Banks are
to buy obligations of the United
States in the market to the extent
of 4*3,000,000,000, the Banks to be
relieved of any penalty if the re-
serves should be deficient as a re-
sult of this action.
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There were two concessions granted which made
these provisions a little less difficult to accept than
they are as they stand. Congress agreed that since the
first three provisions of this act were so clearly in-
flationary, the Federal Reserve Board had the right to
interfere with action resulting from this Act if it felt
that credit was being expanded to an unhealthy degree.
And the provisions of the act were optional rather than
mandatory. This legislation took place on the eve of the
World Economic Conference and was the basis for President
Roosevelt's announcement to that Conference that the
United States would not agree to any stabilization pro-
posals which might be made at that Conference . The de-
preciation of the dollar was criticised by many Europeans
as an unnecessary step taken for the purpose of securing
the advantages resulting from such depreciation. These
critics pointed to the bank rates which the Federal Re-
serve Banks had set. In 1930 the average rate was 2.00,
in 1931, 3.50, in 1932, 2.50, in 1933, 2.00. These
critics claimed that if the depreciation of the dollar
had not been a deliberate move with a purely selfish
motive, the discount rate would have been raised in an
attempt to save the situation by this means. That the
bank rate was low is not surprising for banks had idle
—
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funds in enormous amounts which they were anxious to
dispose of and which were attractive only if cheap.
The critics also pointed to the embargo on gold charg-
ing that maldistribution of gold was one of the causes
of the monetary difficulties throughout the world so
that any loss of gold by the bnited States would be
highly desirable. That the rapid efflux of gold had
been partly responsible for the lack of confidence in
the banking institutions would seem to justify the
government’s action in trying to stem the efflux in
its desire to put the banking system back on its feet.
The government explained its action to the World Econ-
omic Conference, in so far as it made any explanation,
on the ground that with 99% of the banks of the country
insolvent because of assets in the form of frozen mort-
gages, drastic action was necessary to "unfreeae” the
mortgages by means of price rise. The price rise has
been mild, reaching 77.4 in 1935 from 54.3 in 1932.
The President did not use his powers at once regarding
the dollar*. Instead it was allowed to go where it
would as a result of the combined influences of market
and speculation, though in less than four months the
dollar had depreciated 37%.
.
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Inflation Act of May 12 , 1933
On October 25, 1933 the Gold Purchase Plan was
approved authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to
buy domestic gold at the best price obtainable in the
markets. This plan was inaugerated in the hope of
raising commodity prices which had failed to respond
to purchases by the Federal Reserve Banks of government
securities as provided in (1) of the Inflation Act of
May 1933. This plan also anticipated a devaluation
of the dollar v/hich occurred on January 31, 1934.
But between October and January the government paid
out from $31.36 to $35.00 an ounce for domestic gold.
These purchases did not raise prices and occasioned
considerable protest from sound money economists and
others who had viewed all these proceedings with a
skeptical eye.
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934.
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 provided that:
(1) All gold held by the Federal Reserve
Banks or the Federal Reserve Board was
to become the property of the United
States Treasury.
(2) In exchange for this gold the Banks
..
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were to be given credit on the Books
of the Treasury, or gold certificates.
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury was to
have final say as to the acquisition,
melting, export and import of gold.
(4) ho gold was to be minted except on ac-
count of foreign countries and the
Treasury was to hold its reserves against
United States notes and Treasury notes of
1890 in the form of gold bullion.
(5) Profits or losses resulting from changes
in the weight of the gold dollar were to
be borne by the Treasury.
(6) A stabilization fund of $2,000,000,000
was to be set up out of profits from de-
valuation for the purpose of stabilizing
the dollar on the exchanges.
(7) The Inflation Act of 1933 was to be amend-
ed so as to authorize the President to de-
value the dollar by not less than 40% and
not more than 50% of its former value.
The President also was to be permitted to
devalue silver by the same amount and to
issue, if he chose, silver certificates
against the silver bullion held by the
Treasury.
Discussion of Action Taken under these
Acts of Congress
On January 31, 1934 the President fixed the weight
of the gold dollar at 15 5/21 grains of gold 9/10 fine
,
which amounted to a reduction of 40.94%, and established
the price of gold at $35.00 an ounce. The Federal re-
serve Banks could redeem gold certificates in gold bullion
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and settle international balances in gold, although
a levy of .25% was made. This last concession granted
the banks would seem to indicate that we had gone onto
a limited bullion standard. Other results of this Act
were of greater significance . One result is a greater
danger of inflation than ever before since the establish-
ment of the Federal deserve system and this is true be-
cause the Federal Reserve system is becoming more and
more a mere adjunct to the Treasury Department which is
a political organization in lajrge part. The entire
banking system finds itself obliged to absorb government
bonds or else to let its funds lie idle. The burden of
our great national debt rests upon the banks and in many
instances they must act to save themselves rather than
to serve trade and industry. Another unfortunate result
of this Act has been that the gold standard as it was be-
fore the War may never return
5
the present administration
does not appear to have any such plan in mind. In gen-
eral the upholding of the gold standard, or more particu-
larly
,
a return to it, involves many sacrifices; thus
once it is abandoned and a system instituted which operates
with a fair degree of success, the probability of arousing
sufficient sentiment in favor of a return to the old system
is very remote indeed. Frederick A. Bradford in Monetary
-**
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Developments Since 1932 says that:
"After restoring confidence in the
currency, the most efficacious policy
would have been to return to the gold
standard, in order to maintain confi-
dence in the currency, and to interfere
with prices, if at all, only by helping
to correct maladjustments where possible
in the existing price structure." 1
And he adds:
"As a recovery measure the monetary
policy of the Roosevelt Administration
had practically nothing to recommend
it " 2
Doubtless it would be unfair to make such a sweeping
statement about what has taken place in the United States
since 1933 in regard to monetary legislation. The worst
of the depression seems to be a thing of the past. Whether
this is due to or in spite of devaluation of the dollar is
a question. At least one good feature of the Gold Reserve
Act of 1934 is the Stabilization Fund. This fund operates
similarly to that wrhich England has set up and regulates the
fluctuations of the dollar. it is too new a project to
be appraised, though indications are that it will accom-
plish its objective.
The new monetary system in the United States is
1. Monetary Developments uince 1932 Frederick a. Bradford
New York 1934 p.36
2. Ibid p.40

100 .
what the National Industrial Conference Board publica-
tion calls ‘'neither ’fish, flesh, nor fowl’ in the tra-
ditional and orthodox meaning of a gold standard
system The value of the currency rests upon
public confidence in it; gold has no effect upon the
active monetary supply unless the President or Secretary
of the Treasury so ordains; gold may be used in settling
balances of trade, services and capital payment only with
the permission from the Treasury Department. The last
two limitations have an unfavorable effect on trade since
(1) the .American price structure is more closely depen-
dent upon the price structures of other countries than
formerly where gold supplies had influence on the price
level and since (2) the threat of instability of the
dollar interferes with the best use of our productive
resources. The management of the currency is divided
between the Treasury Department which has quantitative
control and the Federal He serve authorities who have
qualitative control. The avowed aim of the new system
is internal monetary regulation in the interests of na-
tional good; the real aim has been and is, at the pre-
sent time, control of the domestic price level.
^Industrial Conference Board, Inc.,
New York, 1934, p. 20.
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CONCLUSION
What will happen to monetary systems cannot, of
course, be predicted with any degree of accuracy. How-
ever, certain general conclusions may be drawn as to
the future of the gold standard.
First: Countries cannot maintain the ratios of
gold to the monetary supply which they were able to do
before the War; France and the United States have come
into possession of more than their share. Whether or
not there is any justice in this situation is beside the
point; the fact remains that these two countries have
the gold and will not give it up. There are certain
events which might take place which would force them to
yield some of their stocks - as an unsuccessful war or a
national calamity such as prolonged and widespread
drought, plague or epidemic as a result of which tremen-
dous purchases of foodstuffs would have to be made abroad.
Especially in the case of the United States both of these
possibilities are very unlikely. Thus there seems to
be no reason to think that the present distribution of
gold will be materially altered for many years to come
,
and as long as this condition exists, the re-establish-
ment of the pre-War gold standard is out of the question.

102 .
Second: Although most nations are inclined
to believe in the desirability of a return to an inter-
national gold standard, as was so loudly proclaimed at
the World Economic Conference in 1933
,
it may be fairly
assumed that the longer nations remain off gold the less
likely are they to wish to return to it. This is true
for several reasons. In the first place, the severing
of the tie between gold and the monetary unit has almost
invariably been accomplished by devaluation. Apprecia-
tion restores normal. But appreciation is not only a
difficult process to carry through but it reduces prices
and wages in such a manner as to be very unpopular with
the general public. When prices are rising during a
period of depreciation of a currency, wages tend to lag
behind the price rise; conversely, when prices are fall-
ing because of appreciation, wages fall faster than prices
causing financial harm to many. In the second place the
advantages to trade and industry resulting from deprecia-
tion are reversed in an appreciation program. Thus even
though countries benefit once a new equilibrium is estab-
lished, the intervening period is likely to produce con-
siderable protest from many interests. And in the third
place
,
Central Banks
,
by~means of the trial-and-error
method, learn how to handle their monetary problems with-
.
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out the use of gold. Certainly banks have much to learn
before they can so manage the various situations which
arise that no injury is done to business and the general
public because of monetary disturbances. But given suffi-
cient time, it seems reasonable to assume that they will
develop a system for managing these situations which will
prove as satisfactory as the pre-War gold standard. As
this system is perfected to an increasingly great extent,
the need for gold decreases in proportion. (Of course,
in this discussion it is recognized that gold will con-
tinue to have a definite use in settling international
balances
.
)
Third: As things stand now, a return to gold is
possible only if this return to gold does not mean a re-
turn to the pre-War standard. It would be possible for
most nations to support a standard wherein reserve ratio
requirements were lower, where the unit was defined as
being equal to the value of a smaller weight of gold,
and wherein every effort was made to effect a trade
balance which would stimulate gold imports rather than
gold exports. Of course, this is not dissimilar from
the system in the United States today. But it is ob-
vious that should all nations stabilize on a basis such
as this, the chances of restabilization at the old high
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level become more remote. Therefore, from the stand-
point of the pre-War gold standard, a unit which is
fluctuating and is completely detached from gold stands
a better chance of being stabilized at its old parity
than one which has been debased and stabilized tempo-
rarily at that low point. England demonstrated the
possibility of making the jump from a unit completely
detached from gold to a stabilized unit of the old pari-
ty when she returned to gold standard in 1925.
Even if a country were willing to endure the pain-
ful process of appreciation, it is entirely unlikely that
it would ever submit to it without the assurance of co-
operation of other countries. World co-operation is
necessary for any monetary reform program of this sort.
Judging on the basis of the experience of the last twenty
years, adequate and effective co-operation seems to be a
rather distant circumstance . Nations are too nationalis-
tic in their attitude to realize that to be international-
istic in this regard is to secure the greatest national
benefit. No country can be independently prosperous for
long. Since, then, individual action is scarcely poss-
ible and universal action unlikely, the possibility of a
return to gold by means of appreciation need not be con-
sidered.
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But even more important in a consideration of
future action along these lines is the fact that the
trend toward greater end greater management has been
so marked in every country in the past thirty-five
years. Were a return to gold likely or even possible,
it must be recognized that the gold standard would be
managed to a high degree . Great impetus to this
tendency was provided by certain forces set in motion
by the World War. These have complicated and in-
volved the whole problem so that now, as the MacMillan
Report pointed out,
"All Central Banks are faced with
the necessity of a greater •management’
of their currency systems.” 1
Whether the new systems be linked with gold or not,
whether the unit be defined in gold or not, whether
gold can be freely exported and imported or not, does
not alter the fact of management in the matter of mone-
tary supply.
^Cited in The Money Revolution,
Sir Charles Morgan-Webb
,
p. 143.
.
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